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The creation of what would become the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) predated 
the Constitution, and the bureau was a part of the Department of War. Congress 
transferred the BIA to the Department of the Interior when it was established in 1849. 
Despite the transfer, the Department of War was still involved in the carrying out of 
Indian policy. The Secretary of War and many within Congress believed the transfer was 
a mistake due to the Department of the Interior’s apparent failure at curbing Indian 
violence, failure at providing proper provisions, and seeming failure to carryout the long 
standing civilization policy. Congress would attempt to transfer BIA back to the 
Department of War on a number of occasions, and the transfer was explored by a number 
of Congressional bodies. The investigations included the Doolittle Committee (1865), 
Peace Commission (1867), Banning Committee (1876), and a Joint Committee created in 
1878 created solely to research the transfer issue. The pressure from these committees 
and the supporters of the Department of War acted as an interdepartmental check system 
between the departments. The added attention pushed the BIA to reform and to improve 
its practices. The transfer debates continued through the 1870s, but would lose support in 






 When Congress voted to create the Department of the Interior in 1849, one of the 
agencies transferred to the new department was the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).1 
Historians have described the transfer as a simple move with BIA officials moving from 
one office building to another, but the move created tension between the Department of 
War, the former stewards of the BIA, and Department of the Interior. Both departments 
played a key role in Indian Policy. While the Department of the Interior was charged with 
negotiating with tribes, distributing annuities and supplies, and carrying out the policy of 
civilizing of the tribes, the Department of War was responsible for enforcing the treaties 
and was on the front lines of Indian wars.  The use of two separate departments to 
carryout single policies created internal tensions that resulted in the Department of War 
requesting that the BIA be returned to their full control. Congress was divided on the 
issue politically, and the debate continued up through the 1870s. 
 The debate between the departments revealed larger issues within United States 
Indian Policy. The United States never had a clearly defined Indian Policy, but just 
introduced one policy after another with the focus on short-term solutions. Early policies 
toward the tribes focused on trade, but in the 1830s a major shift in policy came when 
President Andrew Jackson recommended the removal of tribes from the Southeast to 
reservation land on the plains. The policy of removal would remain in place for the 
remainder of the nineteenth century. Other policies would come and go, however. 
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1 In addition to transfer the BIA to the newly created the Department of the Interior, Congress also 
transferred the General Land Office, the Patent Office and the Pension Office. Henry Barrett. Learned, 





President Ulysses S. Grant’s Peace Policy in the 1870s, for example, was an attempt to 
maintain a peaceful existence with the tribes.  
When the BIA was transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1849, there 
was no real change in policy. A power struggle was created instead. The Department of 
War criticized the Department of the Interior for its corruption and waste of funding. The 
War Department argued that military officers would be less corrupt and, by using military 
channels to supply the tribes, the BIA would be less expensive under the control of the 
Department of War. The Department of the Interior felt it was better at carrying out the 
long standing civilization policy and that if the Army were to force civilization, all the 
progress made would be undone.  
The debate over military or civilian control over Indian Policies is one that played 
out from the 1850s through the 1870s and has been relatively unexplored. The debates 
were present in a number of reports presented by Congress. Historian James John Knecht 
argued that reforms within the BIA were largely driven by this debate. He makes an 
excellent point, but he explores only one Congressional committee held in 1878 that was 
devoted solely to the transfer debate. What he did not explore, were the Doolittle 
Committee of 1865, the Peace Commission of 1867, and the Banning Committee of 
1876. All these Congressional committees discuses the transfer issue, which placed more 
pressure on the BIA to find a solution to the Indian Problem.2 
American Indian History 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 James John Knecht II, “The Proposed Transfer of the Indian Bureau to the Department of War” 




 Historian Donald L. Fixico suggested in 1997 that there had been over 30,000 
books published about American Indians.3 Certainly since that date, and when one 
includes journal articles, that number has grown exponentially. Fixico is not making a 
point about a field that has been over saturated, however. Instead, he reports that non-
Indians wrote 90% of those books.4 This fact suggests that the white perspective has 
tainted Indian history. More Indian historians have moved into the field and have offered 
a unique perspective of American Indian History. A perspective that is vastly different 
from the Amer-centric view of the tribes.5  
Despite the addition of tribal historians, the majority of the works published today 
are still by non-Indians, but as Ned Blackhawk suggests in his 2011 article “Currents in 
North American Indian Historiography,” more emphasis was placed upon integrating the 
tribes into the historiography.6 Blackhawk focuses on tribes of the American Northwest 
and Canada, and explores how tribal histories and interdisciplinary studies have become 
more commonplace in the twenty-first century. This has only made the historiography of 
the American Indian more complex. How then do we break down Indian history? How do 
we make sense of the 30,000+ works? 
Philip J. Deloria divides the historiography of American Indian history into four 
categories. The first of the categories, used by early Indian historians, Deloria dubs 
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3 Donald L. Fixico, “Ethics and Responsibilities in Writing American Indian History,” American 
Indian Quarterly 20 (Winter 1996): 30, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1184939. 
4 This point is discussed by Philip J. Deloria, “Historiography,” in A Companion to American 
Indian History, edited by Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 
Blackwell Reference Online, 
http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781405121316_chunk_g97814051213162 
(accessed February 15, 2012), doi: 10.1111/b.9781405121316.2004.00002.x, but was originally presented 
in Fixico, “Ethics and Responsibilities in Writing American Indian History,” 30. 
5 Philip J. Deloria, “Historiography.”  
6 Ned Blackhawk, “Currents in North American Indian Historiography,” Western Historical 




“Frontier History.” The works that fit into this category are largely based on Frederick 
Jackson Turner’s 1893 thesis on the frontier. The tribes in these early works were 
presented as wild and focus heavily on the boundaries between white civilizations and 
those of the Indian. Deloria suggests that this historiography can be traced back to the 
earliest writings of American history such as William Bradford’s Of Plymouth Plantation 
which focused on the period from 1620-47, and Theodore Roosevelt’s Winning of the 
West. In recent years, historians have re-interpreted the ideas of the frontier and its 
relation to the Indians such as Kerwin Lee Klein’s Frontier of Historical Imagination.7 
Deloria’s second wave of historiography is dubbed “Racial Science and 
Hierarchies.” Beginning in the nineteenth century, scientists sought to determine the 
racial hierarchy of the peoples of the world. While this was mostly an attempt to explain 
the superiority of whites, the development of ethnology as an area of study has been 
important to academia. This era brought about works on Social Darwinism and the like 
that have shaped the way we think of human kind. Deloria argues that these ideas still 
exist today. A recent work on the subject, David Hurst Thomas’s Skull Wars: Kennewick 
Man, Archaeology, and the Battle for Native American Identity provides some insight as 
to how the origins of the Indian race are still in question.8 
The third phase of Indian historiography as described by Deloria is “Modernist 
History.” Deloria argues that within these works we find a change in interpretation. 
Instead of the Indians being viewed as uncivilized and in the way of American expansion, 
works began to explore the negative effects of American policies upon the tribes. One of 
the earliest works was Helen Hunt Jackson’s 1881 book A Century of Dishonor. In it she 
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7 Philip J. Deloria, “Historiography.” 




criticized the United States and its actions toward the tribes. This type of writing makes 
up the majority of what we see on the library shelves today. Modernists tend to view the 
tribes as a monolithic group. This is not entirely the fault of the historians, however. The 
tribes were viewed as a monolithic group by the United States government and the 
primary sources are then reflected in the historiography.9 
Deloria argues that a number of recent historians have adopted the “Postmodern 
or Postcolonial View” of Indian history. The postmodernists take advantage of all the 
available resources to historians. Ethnography and history combined in 1954 to create 
Ethnohistory and this cross-disciplinary study that would become a major part of 
American Indian history. Tribal histories are more commonplace and are incorporated 
into larger Indian histories. Also considered are the concepts of culture and identity. A 
major part of this is due to a major shift in United States Indian Policy in the 1930s where 
eradication of Indian culture became preservation.10 
One of the major works used in the thesis is Francis Paul Prucha’s The Great 
Father: The United States Government and the American Indians.11 Deloria would 
categorize The Great Father as modernist, but Prucha does integrate the tribes and their 
culture where possible while outlining the history of Indian Policy. Prucha’s work 
constitutes an 1,100-page history of American Indian Policy from the Colonial period 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Deloria, “Historiography.” 
10 Deloria, “Historiography.” Other historians agree with Deloria on the interpretation of 
postmodernist American Indian history. Others who have written about postmodernism include: Michael D. 
Green and Theda Perdue, “Native-American History,” in A Companion to 19th-Century America, edited by 
William L. Barney (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), Blackwell Reference Online, 
http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781405149822_chunk_g978140514982216 
(accessed February 15, 2012), doi: 10.1111/b.9781405149822.2006.00016.x and Viola, Herman J. “Some 
Recent Writings on the American Indians.” American Archivist 37 (January 1974): 51-54, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40291568. 
11 Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American 




through the early 1980s. He outlines the missteps of the government and its effect on the 
tribes and policy. Although the field has moved toward the postmodernist ideas, The 
Great Father is still widely used today, but is often used in conjunction with tribal 
histories and ethnohistorical material. Prucha work still stands because as no historian has 
attempted such an extensive look at Indian policy since. 
As a modernist history, this thesis will reexamine sources that have been utilized 
by other modernist historians. This may not follow the current trends of the Indian history 
field, but the reexamination of Indian policy is important. Other prominent historians, 
including Prucha, have interpreted the reports explored herein. However, historians have 
used these reports for other purposes. Few historians have viewed these reports in relation 
to the transfer debates with Knecht being the exception. While he primarily focused on 
the Joint Committee of 1878, the transfer debates and other Congressional investigations 
of the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s were catalysts for reform within the BIA.  
History of Indian Policy 
Within the American Indian historiography, there are a fair number of sub-
categories. Ranging from culture to tribal histories, but Indian Policy is the focus of this 
thesis. The history of Indian policy is a modernist idea as it primarily focuses on policy 
makers within the United States government. Early historians questioned if the United 
States even had a policy. Russell L. Caldwell asked this question in 1956.12 The article’s 
title, “Is There an American Indian Policy?,” serves two purposes as he questions the 
existence of an Indian Policy, and the lack of a historiography of Indian Policy. He 
argued that the United States’ relationship with Indians was complicated, but Caldwell 
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concedes that Indian policy history would be written as the historical field matured.13  By 
the 1980s, the field had matured and this allowed for such as sweeping work by Prucha. 
When browsing the titles of the 30,000+ books on American Indians, one will see 
a number of books with “policy” in the title. For this thesis alone there are a number of 
them, including Edmund Jefferson Danziger’s Indians and Bureaucrats: Administering 
the Reservation Policy During the Civil War, Reginald Horsman’s Expansion and 
American Indian Policy, 1783 – 1812, David A. Nichols’s Lincoln and the Indians: Civil 
War Policy and Politics, Loring Benson Priest’s Uncle Sam’s Stepchildren: The 
Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887, Francis Paul Prucha’s American 
Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900, Ronald N. 
Satz’s American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era, John H. Vinzant’s The Supreme 
Court’s Role in American Indian Policy, and Robert Wooster’s The Military and United 
States Indian Policy 1865 – 1903.14 
With such a variety of titles available, it would seem the field has matured and 
historians have answered Caldwell’s call for an exploration of Indian Policy. These 
works on Indian policy are modernist interpretations by Deloria’s definition.15 Caldwell, 
like many historians, appears to be frustrated with the lack of a cohesive American Indian 
Policy. Since his essay was published in 1956, the overall picture of Indian Policy has 
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13 Caldwell, “Is There an American Indian Policy?” 106. 
14 Edmund Jefferson Danziger, Indians and Bureaucrats: Administering the Reservation Policy 
During the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974); Reginald Horsman, Expansion and 
American Indian Policy, 1783 – 1812 (Lansing: Michigan State University, 1967); David A. Nichols, 
Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy and Politics (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978); 
Loring Benson Priest, Uncle Sam’s Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-
1887 (New York: Octagon Books, 1969); Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers 
and the Indian, 1865-1900 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1976); Ronald N. Satz, American Indian 
Policy in the Jacksonian Era (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975); and John H. Vinzant, The 
Supreme Court’s Role in American Indian Policy (El Paso, LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2009). 




been well covered. Indian removal, allotment, and the Indian New Deal have all been 
widely interpreted, as has the policy of civilization of the tribes, a policy that was present 
from the late eighteenth century until the New Deal. This policy remained throughout 
removal and allotment, both of which represented major shifts in Indian Policy.16 
 Historical actors and historians alike have debated Indian Policy. The debate over 
military or civilian control over Indian Policies is one that played out for over twenty 
years. The debate itself was not necessarily over the creation of policies, but more over 
who controlled it. While both the military and civilian leadership agreed with the Indian 
Policies, they disagreed over how it should be administered. This led to historians 
debating aspects of Indian Policy as well. Arthur N. Gilbert focused on the debate over 
whether Indian Policy is a domestic or diplomatic issue. This debate involved historical 
actors, but has been more recently explored by historians. This debate is centered on the 
use of treaties, normally reserved for foreign powers, to negotiate with tribes. An 
inconsistency explored by Prucha in his 1994 work American Indian Treaties: A History 
of a Political Anomaly. Diplomatic historians often ignored Indian history believing it to 
be a domestic issue, while domestic historians treated the tribes as foreign entities. 
Gilbert argued the answer lay somewhere in the middle.17 What came out of this debate 
was a separate American Indian History that, as Deloria explained, has gone through a 
number of important transformations.18 
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16 The civilization policy remained began in the late eighteenth century and carried through the 
early twentieth century. Works that explore this policy include Horsman, Expansion and American Indian 
Policy, Fritz, Henry Eugene. The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1963, Priest, Uncle Sam’s Stepchildren,  and Prucha, The Great Father, 135-58. 
17 Arthur N. Gilbert, “The American Indian and United States Diplomatic History,” The History 
Teacher 8 (February 1975): 229-241, http://www.jstor.org/stable/491526. 




 The debate between the Department of the Interior and Department of War over 
who should control the BIA exemplified the importance of Indian Policy at that time. 
Because there was no consistent Indian policy, whoever was in control of the policy 
played a role in creating it. When put into the context of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, the debate is important as both departments coveted influence over 
Indian Policy. This alone suggests that there was a policy, but it was not singular. While 
the larger policy of civilization did not change, the ways in which it was carried out 
depended on who was in charge at the time although this may not have been evident to 
the tribes. This was more bureaucratic with the President, Congress, Secretary of War, 
the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and BIA all had varying 
degrees of control over Indian Policy. 
Military vs. Civilian Indian Policy 
Today, as Deloria suggested, Indian History has moved into the postmodern era 
with a focus more upon cultural and social history. Indian Policy and its history remain, 
but is intertwined into the complex relationship between the tribes and the United States. 
However, there is still a necessity for the history of Indian Policy when a particular era or 
debate has been relatively unexplored. Historians must then take a few steps back and 
first develop a “Modernist” point-of-view. The transfer of the BIA in 1849 from the 
Department of War to the Department of the Interior does not signal a major change in 
policy, just a change in who was running it. By the 1860s, the transfer became more 
about politics and funding than about policy itself. With that, I will also explore Indian 
Policy and how it was multifaceted. While the civilization of the tribes would largely 




 This thesis will explore the policy toward the tribes from the American 
Revolution through the 1870s. There are a fair number of policy changes prior to Indian 
Removal, but following removal, the Policy toward the tribes remained largely 
unchanged for fifty years with the polices of removal and the civilization of the tribes. 
My first chapter explores the building of these early policies. In addition, the first chapter 
explores the creation of the BIA and its eventual transfer to the Department of the 
Interior. In this chapter, the transfer issue will be introduced as it was in the 1850s, but it 
became more active following the Civil War.19 
 The Doolittle Committee’s investigation into the conditions of the Indian Tribes is 
the subject of chapter two. It was triggered by a number of Indian massacres including 
the massacre at Sand Creek. While the testimony largely dealt with military atrocities, the 
Doolittle Committee has not been considered in terms of the transfer debates. Ultimately 
the Committee recommended that the BIA not be transferred to the Department of War, 
as it would not solve any of the problems outlined in the Committee’s final report. The 
Doolittle Committee was concerned with the lack of a consistent Indian Policy. More 
importantly, the Doolittle Committee believed it would be difficult for the United States 
government to create any consistent policy if the transfer debate continued.  
 The third chapter explores the changes made to the processes of carrying out 
Indian Policy during the Reconstruction Era. The Peace Commission of 1867 was an 
early attempt to settle issues with warring tribes and provides insight into the 
shortcomings of Indian Policy. President Ulysses S. Grant’s Peace Policy, also discussed 
in Chapter 3, was a response to the Peace Commission’s recommendations for 
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elimination of Indian wars and the improvement of the relationship between the United 
States and all tribes. The Banning Committee is also explored, as it was the only 
Congressional committee to recommend the transfer of the BIA to the Department of 
War. The Committee’s findings were greatly biased, however, as the committee was 
made up of members of the House Military Affairs Committee and the witnesses were all 
military officers but two. The Committee clearly demonstrated the military’s interest in 
the BIA, but critics would refute many of the claims made in the Committee’s final 
report.  
 The Banning Committee led to the 45th Congress’s attempts to transfer the BIA. 
The legislation would pass the House of Representatives with ease, but would fail in the 
Senate. The divide between Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats was to 
blame. There were four transfer attempts made in the 45th Congress, the final of which 
led to the creation of 1878 Joint Committee. The task of the Committee was to investigate 
the transfer issue on a broader scale. What the 1878 Joint Committee discovered was that 
not a great deal had changed since the Doolittle Committee’s investigation in 1865. 
While the Indian Policies had remained largely the same, internal changes had made the 
BIA more efficient. These internal changes were largely made under the pressure of the 
transfer debates as the Department of War criticized the BIA’s handling of the tribes 





Constructing the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Early Indian Policies 
 
 The British had created a relationship with the tribes to prevent them from 
interfering with their colonies. Following the American Revolution, the United States 
would model its own relationships with the tribes from the British. This began by simply 
creating trade agreements and treaties in exchange for peace, but as the United States 
expanded in the early nineteenth century, Indian Policy became more complicated. The 
Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1792 began the policy of introducing civilization to the 
tribes. The policy of civilizing the tribes would continue throughout the nineteenth 
century.1 The relationship was further complicated by President Andrew Jackson’s policy 
of Indian removal in the 1830s and the continued conflicts between the country and the 
tribes on the Plains and Pacific Northwest. 
 As the United States constructed its Indian Policy, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) developed along side it.2 The early BIA, known as the Indian Department, was 
created to oversee Indian trade. As the relationship between the United States and the 
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1 Francis Paul Prucha outlines a speech by President George Washington that contained a series of 
points that would become the goals of Trade and Intercourse Laws. Included in this speech is the 
suggestion of introducing to the Indians the”blessigs of civilization.” The Great Father: The United States 
Government and the American Indians, 2 Volumes (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 
1:90-91. 
2 There is not a great deal of existing literature on the structural elements of the Indian Department 
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Far more informative is Steve Nickerson’s “The Structure of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs,” Law and Contemporary Problems 40, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 61-76. Nickerson offers a 
survey of the structural changes of the BIA from its creation in 1824 to when the article was written. This 
period is discussed in Curtis E. Jackson and Marcia J. Galli, A History of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
its Activities Among Indians (San Francisco: R & E Research Associates, Inc., 1977), but it has been 
panned for its inaccuracies. Where it is used in this thesis, it will backed up with other sources. Prucha’s 
The Great Father offers little information on the structure of the Bureau, but focuses more on the 
relationship between the tribes and the BIA, but Prucha does explore the issue in an earlier work, American 
Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962), 51-65, 250-74. The early history of the Indian Office can also be found in 
Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities and Organization 




tribes became more complicated and the settlers began moving west, the BIA grew into 
an organization charged with removing the tribes from their traditional land and 
negotiating treaties in exchange for their land. Initially under the Department of War, the 
BIA was transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1849. This set off a debate 
between the two departments as to who was the true steward of Indian Policy. 
Development of the Indian Policy 
British policy toward the tribes was aimed to keep the peace. The British would 
send the tribes gifts and made a series of treaties that would prevent further war with the 
tribes. The Imperial government attempted to regulate trade with the tribes, but failed as 
it was difficult to regulate and license traders. What turned out to be more difficult was 
the prevention of white settler encroachment.3 The British negotiated land deals with the 
tribes to acquire tribal lands for the colonies. The British felt it was important to create a 
boundary between the colonies and tribal lands. They believed this would cut down on 
conflict between the two groups. This concept was adopted by the United States during 
and immediately following the American Revolution.4 
The Indian Department, later the BIA, was the name given those tasked with 
Indian Affairs within the Department of War. The Continental Congress focused on 
Indian Policy as early as 1775 with the creation of three separate departments – the 
Northern Department, the Southern Department, and the Middle Department – charged 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For more on the policy of the British toward the tribes read Prucha, The Great Father, 1:5-28 
and William T. Hagan, American Indians, Third Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 
1-37. 




with creating peace with the tribes.5 The established departments were divided into three 
major sections, the Northern Department, which handled the Six Nations of the Iroquois6 
and the tribes living north of them, the Southern Department handled the Cherokee and 
all tribes living south of them, leaving the Middle Department to handle all the tribes in 
between including the Potawatomi and Shawnee.7 Each department was headed by a 
group of commissioners who answered directly to Congress. The primary goal of the 
department was to preserve peace and friendship between the tribes and the Continental 
Congress and prevent them from interfering in the American Revolution.8 
Factions of the tribes of the Iroquois in the Northeast and the Cherokee in the 
Southeast sided with the British during the American Revolution. Many of these tribes 
had sided with the French during the French and Indian War.9 The tribes chose the side 
they felt would win, but were wrong in both cases. This strained relations between the 
tribes and the United States, especially following the American Revolution. Nevertheless, 
the United States realized it would have to deal with these tribes and the others within the 
newly founded country.10 
 Under the Articles of Confederation, the Indian Department’s structure remained 
largely unchanged until 1786 when the three departments were combined into two, the 
Northern District and the Southern District. The Southern District extended to all the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For further reading on these early policies, see Prucha, The Great Father, 1:5-177; Theodore W. 
Taylor, The Bureau of Indian Affairs (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 3-43; and Hagan, American 
Indians, 39-73. 
6 The six nations of the Iroquois included: Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and 
Tuscarora. 
7 Prucha, The Great Father, 1:35-6. 
8 Jackson and Galli, A History of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its Activities Among Indians, 1-
3. Prucha, The Great Father, 1:36-7. 
9 Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years, 11-25. 





tribes south of the Ohio River and the Northern District covered the tribes west of the 
Hudson River. The Ordnance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs, passed August 7, 
1786, removed the bodies of commissioners and called for one appointed superintendent 
per district. The appointments were for two years and the duties of the superintendent 
were updated. The superintendents were placed under the authority of the Secretary of 
War, but Congress was to create Indian Policy and govern the relationship between 
Indian Tribes and the Federal government. As settlers began to move west, there were 
conflicts between the settlers and the Indian Tribes living on the land. The Land 
Ordinances of 1784 called for land in the Northwest11 to be purchased from the tribes and 
divided into states.12 An influx of settlers followed and the passage of the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 called for settlers to respect the tribes of the Northwest and their rights 
to their property.13 
 During this early period of Indian Policy, the two Superintendents of Indian 
Affairs, were placed under the control of the Secretary of War who was charged with the 
day-to-day management of Indian Affairs. As there was no executive under the Articles 
of Confederation, Congress wanted to remain in control of the relationship between the 
tribes and the United States and required the Secretary of War to provide regular reports. 
This meant that the Secretary of War had to keep in contact regularly with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 At this time in American History, the term Northwest referred to the area from the Ohio River 
Valley west to the Mississippi River. 
12 United States Congress, “Documents from the Continental Congress and the Constitutional 
Convention, 1774-1789 - April 23, 1784,” Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(bdsdcc13401)) (accessed November 22, 2011). 
13 Jackson and Galli, A History of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its Activities Among Indians, 




superintendents from the two districts.14 This early form of the Indian Department was 
fairly simple. The country was fairly small, but the United States had encountered a 
number of powerful tribes that were east of the Mississippi.15 
 After the ratification of the Constitution, the Indian Department became a part of 
the Executive Branch when the Department of War was reestablished as a cabinet 
position. Congress still had some control with the required conformation processes for 
Secretary of War and Indian Commissioners and regulating the commerce with the tribes, 
but the oversight of Indian Affairs became the concern of the Executive Branch.16  
As the country expanded, the Indian Department was restructured to 
accommodate the latest acquisitions. This led to the need for more representatives of the 
United States government with Indian tribes. The appointment of trade agents began the 
system of using agents and subagents in the field to handle Indian Affairs. Secretary of 
War Henry Knox used the precedent set by the Treaty of New York of 1790 and 
encouraged President Washington to exercise the power to create treaties with the tribes. 
Knox himself went before Congress to defend the treaties, as they had to be approved by 
the Senate. The Treaty of New York of 1790 and the Treaty of Fort Harmer 1789 set the 
tone for treaties made between the United States and the tribes.17 
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Congress passed the first set of Trade and Intercourse Laws in 1790.18 The laws 
limited the amount of contact between the citizens of the United States, traders, and the 
tribes. Early versions of the Trade and Intercourse Laws failed to regulate trade, and 
President Washington urged Congress to make the laws stronger. The Laws were updated 
over time, and by the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, the laws created strict guidelines. 
Traders were required to be licensed by the government, foreign traders were prohibited, 
and whites were not allowed to settle on Indian land. While the laws were intended to 
regulate Indian trade, they were nearly impossible to enforce. Traders went unlicensed, 
foreign traders were eventually allowed to trade with tribes, and white settlers continued 
to encroach upon tribal lands. In addition, the laws banned the sale of alcohol to the 
tribes, but that failed as well. The laws were well intentioned, but the United States was 
unable to follow up since the Indian Office was too weak to enforce the statutes.19 
In addition to the Trade and Intercourse Laws, Congress established government 
trading houses in 1795.20 The trading houses, known as factories, provided a legal means 
by which traders could access the tribes. The law of 1796 gave President George 
Washington the power to establish trading posts and appoint agents to manage them.21 
The Trade and Intercourse Laws placed regulations on who could trade with the tribes 
and the factories were an attempt to control private trade. These factories were built near 
large concentrations of tribes in both the North and South with the sole purpose of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Congress updated and renewed the Trade and Intercourse Laws every three years in this early 
period. For further analysis of the laws please read, Prucha, The Great Father, 1:89-114 and Prucha, 
American Indian Treaties, 180-3. 
19 Prucha, The Great Father, 1:90-1. 
20 For more analysis of the factory system and its failure see, Prucha, The Great Father, 1:115-34; 
Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins & Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 176-7; and Hagan, American Indians, 75-6. 
21 Jackson and Galli, A History of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its Activities Among Indians, 




providing goods to the tribes at a fair cost. However, the factories lost a great deal of 
money because they were forced to extend credit to the tribes.22 In order to regulate trade 
and the factories, the Office of Indian Trade was established in 1806. Its primary task was 
to oversee the factory system, but the Office was not given the authority to enforce trade 
licensing. The company to which a trader was attached, such as the American Fur 
Company, was required to obtain licenses for its employees.23 Despite the attention paid 
to the factory system, the northern factories did fairly well, but the southern factories fell 
short of demand. In reality the system was very expensive, but because no alternative 
system was found, it was allowed to continue until 1822. 
In the 1810s, there were several wars fought between the United States and tribes 
in the Southeast and the Northwest. These battles coincided with the War of 1812, but the 
war with the Creek dragged on after the conclusion of the war with the British.24 Despite 
the fighting with Creek, the United States was successful in making treaties with other 
tribes. The treaty making system adopted by the United States during the post-colonial 
period set the standard for treaties made until Congress outlawed Indian treaties in 
1871.25 
Attempts to civilize the tribes had been brought up in a variety of ways, beginning 
with the British Imperial government and various acts of the United States in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It was not until 1819 that the attempts became 
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more serious as Congress created the Civilization Fund. The fund was to be used to 
educate the tribes so that they would adopt American agricultural techniques and 
English.26 This is one of the earliest civilization techniques used by the United States, 
and, like most others, was largely unsuccessful. However, the Cherokee had adopted a 
system of government that mirrored that of the United States. The Department was 
simply not large enough to carry these policies out, but it was growing.27 
The responsibilities of the Indian Department broadened with the civilization 
policies and the growing number of treaties between the United States and the tribes. The 
department’s growth became a burden for the Secretary of War. There were several 
attempts by the War Secretaries of the 1810s to correct the issue, but it was clear the 
Department was becoming too large for the Secretary of War to handle. Although, he was 
not directly in control of Indian Policy, those in control answered directly to him. The 
creation of a bureau within the Department of War, headed up by a Commissioner who 
would answer to the Secretary of War, to handle Indian Affairs would make the task 
more manageable.  
Creation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
 Secretary of War John C. Calhoun officially created the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
in 1824. The appointment of a Commissioner of Indian Affairs was the only change that 
took place. The overall substructure (agent system) would remain the same.28 Calhoun 
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had asked Congress for the authority to add additional employees to the War Department 
for the Indian Bureau in 1822, but Congress failed to act.29 On March 11, 1824, Calhoun 
wrote to Thomas L. McKenney, a former Superintendent of Indian Trade, and designated 
him as the leader of the new bureau. Calhoun charged McKenney with “the 
appropriations for annuities, and of the current expenses” relating to Indian policy, and 
that all the “ordinary correspondence with the superintendents, the agents, and sub-
agents, will pass through [the] Bureau.”30 The bureau was established to ease the 
workload of the Secretary of War as he was occupied by the skirmishes with Indian tribes 
in the West.  
After Congress eliminated the failed factory system in 1822, they suggested the 
implementation of a refreshed licensing system for the traders and companies wishing to 
continue their trade with tribes. Calhoun was not opposed to this idea, but realized the 
task would place a further strain and himself and his staff.31 It was after budget cuts and 
the increased responsibilities with the licensing of traders that Calhoun saw his chance to 
create the BIA. Congress limited the number of employees in the Department of War, but 
with the death of a clerk in early 1824, Calhoun used this vacancy to appoint McKenney 
as the head of the BIA. Calhoun then reassigned a few clerks within the Department to 
assist McKenney. With the loophole in the law, and the failure of Congress to act, 
Calhoun had taken action independently to create the BIA.32 
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While Calhoun and Congress were fighting over the BIA, in the early 1820s, there 
was a serious effort to create a “Home Department” and Indian Affairs was one of the 
bureaus suggested to become a part of that department. Although there is no evidence to 
suggest Calhoun knew of this effort, it is likely that he did. Evidence suggests there was a 
major push for the creation of the new department in 1824, and it is possible Calhoun was 
preparing for such a move, but the bill for the creation of the new department failed in 
Congress in 1825.33 Nevertheless, McKenney served as leader of the BIA until 1830. 
Finally, in 1832, Congress approved the BIA and designated its leader as the 
“Commissioner of Indian Affairs.”34 Congress’s approval did nothing but approve of the 
BIA’s structure as it had been drafted by Calhoun. 
Congress passed a law in 1834 establishing the structure of the BIA. The structure 
largely mirrored what was already in place, but it spelled out the boundaries of various 
superintendencies and the agencies that would exist for the various tribes and regions. 
The President was given the power to appoint the superintendents, agents, and subagents 
in the field. In addition, the law allowed the president to use additional force when 
necessary, the Secretary of War had the power to determine tribal boundaries, and the law 
authorized the hiring of interpreters for the agencies. The Secretary of War was given full 
power to carry out terms of treaties including payment of annuities and delivery of goods. 
35 The law closed with the statement that the president may “prescribe such rules and 
regulations as he may see fit, for carrying into effect the various provisions of this act, 
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and any other act relating to Indian affairs.”36 This gave the president a wide range of 
control over the BIA which would be used, under President Jackson, to negotiate treaties 
for removal of the tribes and the creation of reservations. 
Indian Removal 
In the 1830s, the primary task of the BIA was the negotiation of treaties between 
tribes and the United States. Like all treaties, these had to be approved by the Senate. 
President Washington used treaties as a means to gain peace, but during the presidency of 
Andrew Jackson, treaties were used to carry out the removal of tribes to reservation lands 
west of the Mississippi River. Those who were against Jackson’s removal plans were 
holding out for the Supreme Court’s decision on Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.37 The 
Cherokee were being subjected to Georgia state law and sued because they felt they were 
an independent nation. The Supreme Court agreed that the tribes were independent of 
Georgia on March 18, 1831, but Chief Justice John Marshall called the tribes “domestic 
dependent nations.”38 The decision upheld the belief that the Indians were subjected to 
federal law, although they had no constitutional rights.39 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 United States Congress, “Organization of the Department of Indian Affairs,” in Documents of 
United States Indian Policy, ed. Prucha, 70. 
37 For more on the Cherokee’s cases see, Prucha, The Great Father, 1:208-13; Hagan, American 
Indians, 83-6; Ronal N. Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1975), 44-6, 50-2; and John H. Vinzant, The Supreme Court’s Role in American Indian 
Policy (El Paso: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2009). Vinzant tends to weave the results of the cases 
throughout his narrative as opposed to exploring the case individually. 
38 Statz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era, 44. The Georgia cases suggested that 
Indians in the United States were subjected to federal authority, but they also did not have any 
Constitutional rights. They were not citizens of the United States and were treated as foreign entities 
through the use of treaties, but were deemed to be subject to federal law. These contradictions have been 
the subject of a number of books. The Constitutional position of the tribes is well outlined in Frank 
Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian tribes, and the Constitution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). The subject of treaties and the tribes has been well argued by Prucha, America 
Indian Treaties.  




Those against the Removal Act of 1830 hoped the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia would prove useful in stopping Jackson’s removal policy.40 
The court would have to rule the tribes were sovereign nations for this to happen, 
however. The Supreme Court ruled that the Cherokee, and therefore all tribes, were 
sovereign, land holding nations, but subjected to federal law. This followed the precedent 
set by the 1810 ruling of Fletcher v. Peck and President Andrew Jackson could legally 
move forward with the removal of the tribes.41  Once moved to the reservation, tribes 
would be paid annuities in both money and goods. The tribes were reliant upon the 
United States for survival, and this was how it was intended to be.42 
As the removal process was carried out, the BIA went through several phases of 
reform and reorganization. The agency system was slightly restructured to ensure a 
strong connection between the newly created reservations and Washington. The agency 
system divided the tribes into groups with agents representing them. The tasks of the 
agents were to represent the tribes to the BIA as well as deliver annuities and goods as 
outlined in their treaties. The use of agents predated removal, but it became imperative to 
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the tribes following removal, as they were dependent on the agents and the United States 
for supplies.43   
Creation of the Department of the Interior 
Proposals for the Department of the Interior actually predated the BIA. The 
founders considered the creation of a domestic department in the 1780s, but the 
department was never created. In the late 1810s, a bill was introduced to create a “Home 
Department” to control all matters within the United States. It was suggested in Congress 
that the newly created department be given oversight over, “Science and Art, Public 
Economy, Posts, Public Lands, Mint, Patents, Indian Affairs, and Justice.”44 The Home 
Department was essentially a catchall for smaller departments that did not fit comfortably 
within the established executive departments. Plans were drawn up for the creation of the 
Home Department again in the early 1820s, but would again fail in Congress.45 The issue 
was political and it was not until 1849 that the Whigs had a majority in the House and 
approved the Department of the Interior.46 
Just before the creation of the Department of the Interior, there was a great deal of 
change taking place within the United States. In May 1848, the United States acquired the 
American Southwest from Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. With the 
acquisition came a number of large and powerful Indian tribes including the Apache, 
Navajo, and Hopi. The Spanish had struggled with them and left them alone since they 
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were on the periphery of their empire, and the Mexicans had an on and off relationship 
with the tribes.47 At the same time as the transfer, the California Gold Rush drew many 
people west and they crossed lands belonging to many tribes. While there were few 
conflicts as a result, those within the government wondered how the tribes would react to 
the influx of white settlers. 
On March 3, 1849, the United States Congress established the Department of the 
Interior and transferred the BIA to it from the Department of War.48 The Secretary of the 
Interior was given “supervisory and appellate powers now exercised by the Secretary of 
the War Department, in relation to all the acts of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs; and 
shall sign all requisition for the advance or payment of money out of the treasury, on 
estimates or accounts, subject to the same adjustment or control now exercised on similar 
estimates or accounts by the Second Auditor and Second Comptroller of the Treasury.”49 
The Department of War was stripped of its control over Indian Policy, however, there 
was no objection from the Secretary of War. In fact, he was quite glad to be rid of the 
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burden. Within the BIA itself, the transfer was hardly noticeable.50 By 1849, the BIA had 
grown and was primarily made up of civilians who created reports for the Secretary of 
War. These civilians were simply transferred to the Department of the Interior and 
reported to the new Secretary of the Interior, Thomas Ewing. Despite the simplicity of the 
transfer on paper, the Departments of War and the Interior began to fight for control over 
the BIA almost immediately.51  
The New Bureau of Indian Affairs 
 The army became less central to the BIA immediately following its transfer to the 
Department of the Interior, and army agents were slowly removed from reservations and 
replaced with civilian agents. In 1851, Congress modified the BIA, with the support of 
the Secretary of the Interior, calling for the use of civilian, as opposed to military, 
superintendents and agents on Western reservations. The military was slowly losing its 
already slippery control over Indian policy. Despite the restructuring, not all army agents 
were replaced. Military officers would continue to serve in the BIA until it became illegal 
for them to do so in 1870.52  
As the BIA developed, the addition of superintendents, agents, and sub-agents 
made it more difficult for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to have complete oversight. 
The new agents were given the power to negotiate treaties with tribes, as opposed to the 
appointment of special agents assigned to do so. This modification created a new 
hierarchy within the BIA where superintendents, also appointed by the President and 
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approved by Congress, presided over a number of individual agents. Superintendents 
oversaw a collection of agencies within a specific region. In 1851, for example, the focus 
was on establishing a number of regions on the Plains, in New Mexico, and in Texas. 
This expansion increased the number of people between the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs and the sub-agents in the field. This led to a disconnection within the BIA. In 
addition, there was a growing rift between the Departments of Interior and War over who 
should influence Indian Policy.53 
While the Department of the Interior was given control over Indian affairs in 
1849, the Department of War was not entirely relieved of its duties. In fact, there was a 
surge of treaties between the United States, represented by members of the BIA, and 
tribes after the transfer and it was up to the army to enforce them. This led to conflicts 
between the Department of War and Interior because they were both charged with 
enforcing Indian policy. There were many within the Department of War that wondered 
why the BIA was moved in the first place and began to express the opinion that the 
control over Indian affairs should be handled entirely by the army reasoning “one branch 
of the government should not be feeding Indians while another was fighting them.”54  
The violence between the tribes and United States had increased by the end of the 
1850s and that led to the first attempt to move the BIA back to the Department of War. 
This would not be the last attempt to transfer the BIA prior to the Civil War, but all 
attempts resulted the same. There were several attempts to transfer the BIA back to the 
Department of War, the most serious of which came in May 1860 with both the Secretary 
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of War and Secretary of the Interior supporting the decision, but the bill died in 
Congress.55 
Those within the department focused heavily on the established policy of 
civilization with the tribes adopting American and Christian values. Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, George W. Manypenny, was disturbed by a report he received in October 
1855 from Indian agent John Montgomery who discussed the degradation in the lives of 
the tribes in Kansas. Manypenny responded to Montgomery’s report by writing to 
Superintendent of Indian in St. Louis Affairs Colonel A. Cummings that the policy of the 
United States was not to assist in the degradation of the tribes, but to promote their 
welfare and improvement. This policy, known as the civil policy, became the primary 
policy of the BIA under the Department of the Interior following the transfer in 1849. 
The relationship between the United States and the tribes became a parent-child 
relationship, and this was evident in many of the aspects of the exchanges between the 
tribes and the United States.56 
 Despite the disagreements over the role of the military in Indian affairs, the BIA’s 
agents were often based within a military fort with a concentration of military personnel 
for support. The issue became more convoluted because within some forts, the BIA agent 
was a civilian, but had more authority in the region than the military officers stationed at 
the fort.57 This only deepened the tensions between the Department of the Interior and the 
Department of War.  
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In 1860, as a response to a surge of Indian disturbances in the late 1850s, 
Secretary of War John B. Floyd proposed the transfer of the BIA back to his department. 
The resolution in the Senate was supported by Interior Secretary Jacob Thompson who 
was well aware that the Department of War had “superior facilities for controlling and 
managing ‘the wild, roving, and turbulent tribes of the interior, who constitute the great 
majority of the Indians.”58 The Secretary supported the proposition because it would take 
all the responsibility of the BIA out of his hands. The bill, however, died quickly in the 
Senate and the matter of transferring the BIA was quickly dwarfed by the Civil War.59 
 The tribes were a concern during the war. Some tribes opted to remain neutral, but 
many tribes opted to side with the Confederacy during the war. In 1861, the Creeks, 
Choctaws, Seminoles and Cherokee all joined the South.60 Meanwhile, on the plains, the 
Sioux began to rebel against the United States as well. The United States was fighting 
two wars, one against the South and one against the Sioux. It became clear that 
something needed to be done to gain control over the tribes. The conditions of the tribes 
had worsened as a result of the war, and the transfer debate had returned once again. 
Congress took both of these issues seriously and, in March 1865, formed a Joint 
Committee to investigate the condition of the tribes and the transfer issue.61 
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Military Mismanagement: The Doolittle Committee of 1865 
 
 The House Committee on Indian Affairs was concerned with the continued wars 
between the tribes and the United States, and focused heavily on the atrocities of Sand 
Creek. They proposed the formation of a joint committee, which was approved in March 
1865. The primary purpose was to visit specific regions to investigate atrocities 
committed by the military and get a better understanding of the causes of war between 
the tribes and the United States. The investigation would be carried out with a series of 
interviews with BIA officials and agents, military personnel, local citizens, and members 
of the tribes. The committee became known as the Doolittle Committee, named for the 
committee’s chairman Senator James R. Doolittle.  
The goal of the committee was to determine the condition of the tribes and to 
determine whether the BIA should remain a part of the Department of Interior or be 
returned to the Department of War. The committee highlighted the many errors the 
United States had made when dealing with the tribes, and would provide a series of 
recommendations for Congress and the BIA to restructure Indian Policy to better meet 
the needs of the tribes. Those interviewed described the encroachment of white settlers, 
dwindling number of tribal members, poor supplies, and the violence of recent events 
between the tribes and the United States Army. Though at times the testimony could 
become a series of accusations pointed at various factions within the Department of War 
or Department of the Interior, the Committee’s final reports outlined an Indian Policy that 
would have benefited the tribes.1 
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Establishing the Doolittle Committee 
 The Doolittle Committee was criticized for not living up to its goal of determining 
the condition of the tribes following the Civil War.2 Some historians accept the Doolittle 
Committee as an explanation of the conditions of the tribes of the West, but most 
historians understand that the exploration of the tribes is limited as only twenty tribes 
were interviewed. The Committee also did not visit the more hostile tribes. Although this 
was likely for their safety, the result is an incomplete and biased view of the causes of 
war. Despite the limited number of tribes interviewed, the report sheds light on some 
important issues such as the perceived brutality of the military and the poor supplies 
received by the tribes. The current historiography focuses heavily on these two points. 
 One of the best narratives on the Doolittle Committee comes from United States 
Indian policy historian Francis Paul Prucha. His book, American Indian Policy in Crisis: 
Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900, was one of the earliest works to discuss 
the committee in detail (he would largely repeat this narrative in his book The Great 
Father: The United States Government and the American Indians). His narrative became 
the norm when discussing the Committee. Donald Chaput provides a detailed analysis of 
the questionnaire provided to those questioned by the Doolittle Committee. Prucha draws 
some of his analysis from Chaput’s article.3 Historians Paul Stuart and Edmond Jefferson 
Danziger, Jr. are cited by Prucha, but their narratives are less detailed.4 
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Legislation to create the Doolittle Committee was introduced by Senator James R. 
Doolittle, Republican of Wisconsin, on January 9, 1865, but was not authorized by 
Congress until March 3.5 The group was made up of three Senators and four 
Representatives.6 They were to tour the West and interview members of tribes, Indian 
Agents, military officers and anyone who had an interest in Indian Policy. To speed up 
the process, the committee broke into three separate groups. In addition, the Committee 
sent out questionnaires to those who were unable to attend the meetings. It is from these 
questionnaires that the goals of the committee can be determined.7 They were asked 
about the conditions of the tribes, the quality of the food the tribes were provided with, 
the possibility of corruption on a reservation, and violence toward the tribes.8 The 
question about violence toward the tribes stemmed largely from the November 1864 
Indian Massacre at Sand Creek in Colorado Territory.9 
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Charges of stolen livestock focused on the Cheyenne and Arapahoe and led to on 
and off fighting between the Colorado militia and the tribes.10 In 1864, the tribes met 
with Colorado Territorial Governor John Evans and Colonel John M. Chivington and 
assumed they were there to negotiate peace.  Instead, Governor Evans and Colonel 
Chivington were there to gauge the strength of the tribe. The Cheyenne and Arapaho, led 
by Black Kettle and White Antelope, turned in their arms at Fort Lyon and moved to 
Sand Creek. Unarmed, the tribes were attacked by Colonel Chivington on the morning of 
November 29. The Army killed men, women, and children, leaving many of their bodies 
mutilated.11 The Sand Creek Massacre, as it became known, was one of the reasons the 
Doolittle Committee was formed. 
 The Committee’s findings are important to the field of Indian policy. The creation 
of the Committee explores the interest in the condition of Indian Affairs. Historians have 
skimmed over the testimony and use the Doolittle Committee to explore the Sand Creek 
Massacre. The findings of the Doolittle Committee are important because they explain 
the condition of the tribes as well as the perceived causes of Indian wars. The committee 
found that the tribes were decreasing in numbers, particularly those not living in Indian 
Territory. The committee also explained that Indian wars almost always linked to white 
aggression, mostly in the form of settlers or squatters.12 
 The other primary focus of the committee was whether the BIA should remain 
within the Department of the Interior or return to the Department of War. This is also 
explored by Prucha, Danziger, and Stuart. However, other historians have had an interest 
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in this issue as well. Military historian Robert Wooster focuses on the transfer issue in 
two of his major works, The Military and United States Indian Policy 1865 – 1903 and 
The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783 – 1900.13 
The transfer issue was not one of the reasons for the creation of the committee but the 
committee’s testimony would be used by those opposed to the transfer of the BIA to the 
Department of War.14 
 In addition to determining the causes of wars between the United States and the 
tribes, the committee was charged with making recommendations for correcting the 
inconsistencies in Indian Policy. The final report is openly critical of the United States’ 
actions and makes a number of recommendations to improve the relationship between the 
United States and the tribes. One of the recommendations was the removal of the Plains 
tribes to reservations that would be out of the way of white settlers. This would avoid 
future contact between the two groups. In addition, they would be given the tools 
necessary to become more civilized. The second recommendation highlighted by Prucha 
was the creation of a special commission to be sent to negotiate with the tribes on the 
plains.15 This commission was created in 1867 (and will be discussed in Chapter 3). 
 The historiography of the Doolittle Committee is brief. In fact, the writings of 
Prucha, Danziger, Stuart, and Wooster on the Doolittle Committee do not even amount to 
twenty pages total, but the committee’s final report and transcripts contain nearly 600 
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pages. So what is left out? A great deal actually. The most important parts of the report 
that are left out by historians include the testimony of the tribes. There is also testimony 
from Indian Agents and military personnel that, when put into the proper context, can tell 
the story of the tribes’ struggles. 
 Although the Doolittle Committee’s report and testimony have been used by a 
variety of historians, there are some issues with it.16 Prucha suggested, “the statements 
were inconsistent, the charges often unsubstantiated, and the facts many times in error. 
The large volume hardly presented an accurate picture of the ‘condition of the Indian 
tribes,’ but no matter, for it furnished ammunition for those seeking change.”17 His 
charges of occasional inaccuracy and unsubstantiated claims are true, but just as other 
historians have used the testimony to explore the events of Sand Creek, the testimony can 
be used to explore the debate between the Department of the Interior and the Department 
of War over the control of the BIA.  
Testimony 
 The testimony from the Doolittle Committee was appended to the final report, 
which was delivered to Congress January 26, 1867.18 While much of the secondary 
literature dealing with Indian Policy focuses on the final report, the testimony is equally 
important. From the testimony the battle between the Departments of War and Interior 
can be seen. The report speaks of the poor condition of the tribes, and the causes of wars 
between the United States and the tribes. Prucha charged that the testimony was full of 
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unsubstantiated claims and inaccuracies, but looking past these, there were serious issues 
with American Indian Policy and the tribes were suffering for it. Charges of military 
brutality, poor supplies, and the mismanagement of treaties were highlighted and played 
into the transfer debates. As this is demonstrated throughout the testimony, the best way 
to present the arguments is to look at the opinions of those involved, including members 
of the Army, local residents, religious officials, Indian Agents, and tribal members. The 
final report presented to Congress largely focused on members of the military, but a 
number of other witnesses were interviewed. 
 The Doolittle Committee interviewed forty-five Army officers, enlisted personnel, 
and retired military. The majority of them saw, and even participated in, the degradation 
of the tribes and felt, when asked, the military would be better suited to handle Indian 
affairs. Throughout the testimony, the general consensus was that the condition of the 
tribes was worsening, and aggressive white settlers were often the causes of war between 
the United States and the tribes. Colonel Kit Carson, having lived among the Indians for 
nearly forty years, explained, “From what I have heard, the whites are always cursing the 
Indians, and are not willing to do them justice.”19 He goes on to explain that white settlers 
often blame the Indians for missing livestock saying, “these cattle by his [the farmer] 
negligence frequently stray off; always, if anything is lost, the cry is raised that he 
Indians stole it.”20 
 The charges of stolen livestock led to a confrontation between the military and 
Indians comes from Colorado. Corporal Amos C. Miksch and Asbury Bird were present 
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during the Sand Creek Massacre.21 Bird explained that there were charges of stolen cattle 
and that they were sent to recover them. Bird explains that as they approached, the tribes 
retreated and the Army laid chase. They engaged in battle the following day. It is Bird’s 
explanation of the aftermath that is most troubling. “I went over the ground soon after the 
battle. I should judge there were between 400 and 500 Indians killed. I counted 350 
laying up down by the creek. I think about half the killed were women and children. 
Nearly all, men, women, and children, were scalped. I saw one woman whose privates 
had been mutilated. The scalps were carried away mostly by the 3rd regiment.”22 These 
graphic details were printed in newspapers around the country and would be used by 
those opposed to the transfer of the BIA to the Department of War citing the violent 
nature of the military toward unarmed Indian women and children. 
  Nevertheless, the majority of the Army personnel interviewed favored the 
transfer of the BIA to the Department of the Interior. The testimony of military personnel 
taken by the Doolittle Committee is largely much like that of Major General John Pope.23  
He blamed the degradation of the tribes on white settlers and failed government policy. 
While there is a great deal of truth to the charges of failed policy and corruption, the 
testimony of Asbury Bird and Corporal Miksch brought to light the unnecessary violence 
brought against the tribes. It is important to note that not all in the military were 
unsympathetic. A number of generals were sympathetic to the plight of the tribes, and 
they would have almost certainly supported the transfer.24 Although the charges of 
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mismanagement by the BIA were true, the testimony of Army brutally overshadowed the 
internal issues. The Doolittle Committee would conclude the use of Civilian agents was 
more beneficial to the tribes as a result. 
 In addition to interviewing military personnel, the Doolittle Committee 
interviewed individuals who had other interests in relation to the tribes. Those 
interviewed ranged from local residents, religious officials, and employees of Indian 
reservations. Their testimony offers an interesting mix of opinions, as some felt 
threatened by the tribes, while others are sympathetic towards them. Their answers are 
much more diverse than that of the military personnel because they had different 
interests.  
 Religious organizations had been an important part of the government’s Indian 
policy, and there were a number of missionaries present on Indian reservations. In the 
Southwest and California, these missions were remnants of the Spanish Empire and were 
Catholic. The committee called for testimony from Juan Baptiste Laney, the Roman 
Catholic Bishop of New Mexico, Arizona and Colorado. His experience was with the 
Pueblo Indians, having lived in the region for fourteen years. He explained that the 
populations were declining, and he expressed his concerns over the number of violent 
bands of Indians. In addition, he describes members of the Pueblo tribes as “industrious, 
of gentle, mild manners, and are Christians.”25 
In addition to the brutality of the Army, the Doolittle Committee was concerned 
with the supplies reaching the tribes. Dakota Territory Governor Newton Edmunds wrote 
to the committee about his concerns with the lack of supplies given to the tribes. He 
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explained that the tribes of the Yankton reservation “have very little upon which to 
subsist while their crops are growing.”26 He wrote in August 1865 to the refute some 
statements made by Major H. M. Conger (who had yet to be interviewed by the 
committee27) stating that, “I cannot fully agree with Major Conger in all references. Some 
of them [Indians] are willing and ready to work.”28 Major Conger was charged with the 
cultivation of crops on the reservation and, from the Governor’s statement, appears to 
have questioned the Indians’ work ethic. The testimony of Governor Edmunds illustrates 
shortcomings of those charged with Indian Policy. The lack of supplies and the points of 
contention between the various parties involved only harmed the tribes. 
 The Doolittle Committee interviewed members and representatives from a 
number of tribes.29 They were asked questions about their tribes’ conditions and 
interactions with the military and governmental officials. Their testimony was left out of 
the final report presented by the Doolittle Committee, but it is important, as it is the 
opinion of those directly affected by the Indian policy, Army brutality, poor supplies, and 
the encroachment of whites. Military personnel, religious officials, local residents, and 
Indian agents could only provide a limited portion of the story, but the testimony from 
tribal members and the tribal chiefs provided true insight to the condition of the tribes. 
 Although the Committee interviewed a number of tribal chiefs, they did not 
interview individual tribal members. While the testimony of the chiefs provides some of 
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the best first-hand accounts available to the committee, the Committee interviewed a 
select few “tribal members.” The first to be interviewed was Edmond G. Guerrier was a 
twenty-five year old born to a Frenchman and Cheyenne woman. He testified to the 
atrocities described by Asbury Bird and Corporal Miksch and assisted in the peace 
negotiations following the battle. While he offered little on the condition of his tribe, he 
did testify to the brutality of the military when handling the Cheyenne, especially at Sand 
Creek.30 
 Edward R. Pond, a mission teacher with the Santee, described the poor food the 
tribes were forced to eat. When animals died, such as mules and horses, the Indians were 
forced to eat them. In addition, the military poisoned wolves that were near the 
reservation and the Indians would eat them as well. Pond described the desperation of the 
tribes during the winter and the lack of provisions necessary for them to survive. He 
described the process by which supplies were distributed by the agency. He stated that 
the agents were not sure if the tribes were given their provisions. From his testimony, it 
seems the agents divided the goods among the chiefs and left them in a warehouse for the 
chiefs to collect. They have no records showing when or who picked up the goods.31 
Clearly there were errors made on the Crow Creek Reservation, but these harsh 
conditions were not limited to the one reservation. 
 Chiefs from the Winnebago described the poor conditions of their tribe. The 
Committee interviewed four chiefs from the tribe, all describing the degradation of the 
tribe. Chief Little Hill described how they were suddenly removed from their homelands 
in Minnesota to their reservation in Nebraska. They were forced to leave behind a 
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number of horses and their planted crops. After being moved a number of times due to 
lack of sufficient supplies on various other reservations, the Winnebago found a 
permanent home. Nevertheless, Chief Little Hill described the condition of the tribe as 
being very poor. “You see us here now. We are most all naked; the whole tribe. Some of 
the tribe are more destitute of clothing than we are. We got some goods here now which 
the Great Father [United States] sent us. They are lying in the Omaha warehouse, and we 
don’t know but that the rats have eat [sic] them.”32 The other Winnebago chiefs 
interviewed agreed with Chief Little Hill. The Doolittle Committee heard testimony from 
Chief Big Bear, Chief Whirling Thunder, and Chief Decorah.33 They all agreed with 
Chief Little Hill’s statements about the tribe’s condition. 
 As it turns out, Chief Little Hill had already testified to the tribe’s condition in 
Washington D.C. a year earlier. He describes this meeting and its aftermath. “The time I 
went to Washington last winter I asked the commissioner about my goods, and he said 
the goods had already been sent, and when I got back the agent would give them to us. 
But when we ask [sic] our agent for them he will not give them to us. The reason, I 
suppose, he will not give us our goods, he is mad with us, because our young men have 
been talking that the major [the current agent, Major Blacombe] would be removed and a 
new agent appointed.”34 The tribe was clearly unhappy with their agent and they were 
hoping he would be replaced. They assume this is why they were not given the provided 
provisions. 
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 When the tribes could not be interviewed directly, the Doolittle Committee relied 
on testimony from Indian Agents. The committee received a letter from Agent J. Harlan 
on August 1, 1865. He was the agent for the Cherokee Nation. He wrote that he had been 
the agent for the Cherokee since 1862 and had spent times with other tribes in Indian 
Territory. He spoke of the Cherokee as a robust group and with a fairly healthy and 
steady population.35 From his testimony, it is clear that the Cherokee, and tribes within 
Indian Territory, were the exception to the degrading conditions of the Indian tribes. 
Their population was fairly steady and they were, by Harlan’s definition, civilized. This 
is likely due to the amount of time they had been present in Indian Territory, as they had 
been on their reservations for nearly thirty years.36 
 The testimony presented in the Doolittle Committee provided a limited view of 
the conditions of the tribes within the United States. The Committee seemed to have 
chosen to visit the tribes that were in the worst condition, such as the Winnebago, and 
focused on the most extreme examples of military brutality. The Cherokee and other 
tribes in Indian Territory did not receive a great deal of attention by the Committee 
because they were not in as dire conditions as some of the tribes interviewed. The 
testimony placed blame on the military for its extreme brutality.  
The Final Report 
 When the Doolittle Committee completed its investigation in late 1865, it took it 
over a year to compile the testimony and deliver the results to Congress. Some suggested 
the report was purposefully held back because of the revealing nature of the testimony.37 
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Nevertheless, the final report was issued January 26, 1867 and was fairly anticlimactic 
considering the explosive testimony it collected. The report simply answered the five 
questions it was charged with answering. 
 The final report is only eight pages long and provides answers to five questions. 
For the first, regarding the population growth or decline of the tribes, the committee 
found that “the Indians everywhere, with the exception of the tribes within the Indian 
Territory, are rapidly decreasing in numbers from various causes [list].”38 This statement 
is followed by quotes taken from the testimony, but none from tribal members; in fact, all 
the quotes are from generals. The second question they addressed the causes of Indian 
wars with whites. The committee found that the wars could be traced to “lawless white 
men.”39 Third, the committee found that the tribes’ hunting grounds had disappeared as a 
result of white migration. 
 The fourth question, concerning the BIA’s position within the Department of the 
Interior, was answered by the committee by stating that the BIA should remain where it 
was. This is likely due to the violence inflicted upon the tribes by the Army described 
within the testimony, but again, no tribal testimony is quoted in the report. In fact the 
committee stated: “While it is true many agents, teachers, and employees of the 
government are inefficient, faithless, and even guilty of peculations and fraudulent 
practices upon the government and upon the Indians, it is equally true that military posts 
among the Indians have frequently become [centers] of demoralization and destruction of 
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the Indian tribes.”40 A true, but tactful statement made about the ways in which both the 
Department of the Interior and Department of War had wronged the tribes. 
 The Doolittle Committee outlined the arguments of each side, but ultimately 
concluded the civilization policy was most important and the Army was not equipped to 
carry out the policy. The argument presented by the military was that they believed they 
would be better equipped to distribute annuities and goods, as their officers are more 
honest than the civilian agents of the BIA. While those in support of the Department of 
the Interior argued that the military was too harsh, even in times of peace and that the 
tribes must be taught to farm and be better educated. Supporters of the BIA pointed out 
that civilian agents were better at these tasks than military officers. The committee argued 
that even the tribes currently at war with the United States would one day require these 
tools of civilization.41 
 The Doolittle Committee concluded that although it was best for the BIA to 
remain within the Department of the Interior, the conflicts between the two departments 
did provide a major benefit. The jealousy between the two departments meant that neither 
was slow to point out the other’s mistakes. This would be important, as it would feed into 
the continued development of the BIA and the Department of the Interior. Interestingly, 
the Committee’s decision to keep the BIA within the Department of the Interior was 
unanimous. 
 The fifth and final question answered by the committee was what he government 
could do for the tribes. They recommended that Congress approve of a board of 
inspectors for the BIA. The board would comprise of members of the religious groups, 
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the military, and civilians. The reservations would be apportioned and boards would be 
appointed to ensure tribal members received the goods they were due.42 This suggestion 
was never acted upon. In fact, the committee as a whole never stirred any cause for 
reform within the government, but as Prucha explains, the only groups the committee’s 
report and testimony affected were the reform movements and the religious missionary 
groups.43  
 The Doolittle Committee has little presence in the secondary literature on Indian 
Policy, despite its importance to the Reform movements. The committee had a chance to 
make a difference for the tribes that were suffering in the West. The testimony from the 
Indian Agents, tribal members, and even the military all agreed the tribes were suffering. 
Nevertheless, the committee’s final report was delayed and far too weak to make any 
difference. The testimony has been ignored, and even dismissed, by historians, but its 
importance can be seen when we read past the inaccuracies. Prucha criticized the wrong 
portion of the Doolittle Committee’s final report. The appendix may have been full of 
bias and inaccuracies, as the final report only outlined the problems, but offered no 
solutions. 
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The Peace Policy and the Transfer Debates 
 
 The period following the Civil War is heavily focused on Reconstruction, and the 
political establishment largely ignored the recommendations made by the Doolittle 
Committee.1 The period was plagued by wars with the Sioux on the Plains, Modoc in the 
Pacific Northwest, and the Apache in the Southwest. The violence between the tribes and 
the United States had several effects. The first was the use of the Peace Commission of 
1867 in an attempt to quell the violence on the plains. The Commission made a series of 
recommendations meant to ease the tension, but the majority were ignored. President 
Ulysses S. Grant’s Peace Policy became yet another attempt to curb the violence, and the 
changes implemented by the Peace Policy directly affected the BIA and its organization. 
 The wars between the tribes and the eventual failure of Grant’s Peace Policy 
brought to the forefront the debate over which department, the Department of the Interior 
or the Department of War, should contain the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress 
would briefly take up the issue in 1875 leading to a report by the Committee on Military 
Affairs, known as the Banning Committee, to recommend the transfer of the BIA to the 
Department of War in 1876. The transfer request was made as the BIA was implementing 
a new organization chart that placed missionaries at the forefront of selecting those who 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Few historians have written about what followed the Doolittle Committee. Those who cover the 
subject tend to jump from the Doolittle Committee to the Peace Commission of 1867, which was 
recommended by the Doolittle Committee. Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States 
Government and the American Indians, 2 Volumes (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 
1:485-88, spends a few pages on Doolittle and follows it up immediately by the Peace commission. 
Doolittle is briefly mentioned by Robert Wooster in The American Military Frontiers: The United States 
Army in the West, 1783 – 1900 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 201, and briefly 
mentions the Peace Commission on the same page. Prucha and Wooster focus on different areas of history, 
Indian Policy and military policy, respectively, and neither spends a great deal of time analyzing the 




would conduct Indian Policy.2 Although the efforts of the Peace Policy would largely 
fail, the BIA’s internal organization and religiously affiliated agents did begin a process 
of improvements within the BIA. 
The Civil War and Renegotiation 
 During the Civil War, a number of tribes in Indian Territory believed they would 
be better served by the Confederate government. Factions of the Five Civilized Tribes 
opted to join the Confederacy. The Cherokee, for example, split into a band that 
supported the United States and one that supported the Confederacy. Many of the tribes 
that supported the Union were forced out of Indian Territory by the fighting and the tribes 
loyal to the Confederacy. The majority of these refugees fled to Kansas and Missouri 
where they were placed on temporary reservations.3 The important point is that the tribes 
were split. After the Civil War, the tribes were treated as though they had all abandoned 
the United States.4  
 The Confederate government created a separate BIA within its War Department.5 
As it was the Southern Democrats who had largely supported the transfer of the BIA back 
to the Department of War, it is not surprising that the Confederacy would immediately 
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create a BIA within their own Department of War. Officials from the Confederate BIA 
were sent to negotiate treaties with a number of tribes in Indian Territory. The first tribes 
to join included the Creeks, Choctaws, and Seminoles.6 One notable hold out from the 
early treaties were the Cherokee, but they too joined the Confederacy on October 7, 
1861.7 The full tribal populations did not support the Confederacy; however, as the 
Cherokee in particular had a number of factions that chose to remain neutral. The war in 
Indian Territory was hard on the tribes, as much of what the Five Civilized Tribes had 
built was destroyed. The tribes that had joined the Confederacy returned their allegiance 
to the United States before the end of the war, but the damage had been done. The United 
States viewed the tribes that had joined the Confederacy as hostile.8 
 The Civil War contributed to renewed violence in the trans-Mississippi West. 
Many of the tribes had been volatile, and the Civil War was a catalyst for many of these 
battles, as the Army was distrustful of all tribes. While President Abraham Lincoln was 
sympathetic toward the tribes, the Civil War dominated politics and attempts to work 
with tribes were overshadowed.9 As the United States began the process of 
Reconstruction, the attention to Indian Policy was resumed.10 Sympathy for the Indians in 
the West, however, was virtually non-existent. Westerns felt the task of the United States 
was to subdue the tribes and bring them back into the United States despite the fact the 
majority had returned to the United States before the war’s conclusion.11 
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 One of the primary tasks of the BIA following the Civil War was to renegotiate 
treaties with the Five Civilized Tribes, who had sided with the Confederacy during the 
war. During the summer of 1865, there was an internal debate over how to handle the 
renegotiations, but ultimately, members of BIA, Army, and the tribes met in Fort Smith, 
Arkansas in September 1865 to negotiate with the tribes and develop a civilian 
government in Indian Territory. This meeting was open only to the factions of the tribes 
who remained loyal to the Union during the war, with those who fought against the 
Union meeting separately. The tribes were unhappy with this because many had already 
taken steps to reconcile. For example, the Cherokee’s National Council had voted in 1863 
to repeal their treaty with the Confederacy and voted to abolish slavery.12 
When the Five Civilized Tribes agreed to meet with the United States in Fort 
Smith, the American representatives’ goal was to get the tribes for the Indian Territory to 
give up sections of land so that the other tribes could be moved to the area. These tribes 
were dealt with fairly harshly and were told that by leaving the Union they had forfeited 
their rights to annuities and to their land, but the President was willing to negotiate new 
treaties with them. This statement surprised the representatives of the tribes, as they did 
not have the authority to negotiate treaties on the tribes’ behalf.13 Nevertheless, the 
meeting proceeded and outlined seven points that were to be included in all renegotiated 
treaties: 
1. Each tribe must enter into a treaty for permanent peace and amity with themselves, 
each nation and tribe, and with the United States 
2. Those settled in Indian Territory must bind themselves, when called upon by the 
government, to aid in compelling the Indians of the plains to maintain peaceful 
relations with each other, with the Indians in the territory, and with the United States 
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3. The institution of slavery, which has existed among several of the tribes, must be 
forthwith abolished, and measures taken for the unconditional emancipation of all 
persons held in bondage, and for their incorporation into the tribes on an equal 
footing with the original members, or suitably provided for. 
4. A stipulation in treaties that slavery, or involuntary servitude, shall never exist in the 
tribe or nation, expect in punishment of crime. 
5. A portion of the lands hitherto owned and occupied by you must be set apart for the 
friendly tribes in Kansas and elsewhere, on such terms as may be agreed upon by the 
parties and approved by government, or such as may be fixed by the government. 
6. It is the policy of the government, unless other arrangement be made, that all nations 
and tribes in the Indian territory be formed into one consolidated government after 
the plan proposed by the Senate of the United States, in bill for organizing the Indian 
territory. 
7. No white person, except for officers, agents, and employés of the government, or of 
any internal improvement authorized by the government, will be permitted to reside 
in the territory, unless formally incorporated with some tribe, according to usages of 
the band.14 
 
The recommendations made by the committee charged with the negotiations 
showed some of the fallout as a result of the Doolittle Committee and the Sand Creek 
Massacre. There were military officers present at the negotiations and the debate between 
the two departments seems to be absent from the stipulations of the agreement. The Five 
Civilized Tribes resented several of the points outlined by the committee. The tribes were 
unhappy with their treatment by the government and refused to agree to the terms. 
Because of these disagreements, the meeting in Forth Smith was largely a failure. No new 
treaties were established, but the tribes accepted that they were under the jurisdiction of 
the United States. With the basic information in place, individual treaties would not be 
negotiated until a later date.15 
Indian Hostilities 
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Following the Civil War and into the 1870s, violence continued between the 
United States and tribes on the plains, the Pacific Northwest and the Southwest.16 The 
military found itself, once again, handling the tribes the Department of the Interior’s 
policies had seemingly failed. As the United States learned from the Doolittle Committee, 
wars between the tribes and the United States were fueled primarily by white 
encroachment, but little could be done to prevent this from occurring. A number of tribes, 
including the Sioux and Modoc, were resisting removal from their traditional lands to 
newly created reservations. Other tribes such as the Kiowas, Comanches, and Cheyennes 
were rebelling because they were not allowed leave the reservation to hunt, as provisions 
provided by the United States were not sufficient and of a poor quality. All these issues 
called into question the BIA and Department of the Interior’s control over Indian Policy 
and led to the reintroduction of the transfer issue in Congress. 
The wars on the Great Plains had plagued the United States since the 1850s, and 
continued to do so in the 1870s. Wars continued with the Kiowas and Comanches who 
were leaving their reservation to hunt and raid other reservations. The Cheyennes also 
joined in with these tribes as the military began to bear down upon them. While the 
military was fighting the Kiowas and Cheyenne, the wars on the plains included the 
Lakota Sioux as well. The wars between the United States and the Sioux were 
particularly violent and flared on and off throughout the 1860s and 1870s.17 
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 The Modoc War began in the Pacific Northwest in 1872 after the tribe began to 
feel threatened by white encroachment. The encroachment began in the mid-1860s when 
white settlers squatted on land that belonged to the tribe. When the Modocs discovered 
the settlers, tensions between the settlers and the tribe prompted the deployment of the 
army to the reservation in 1872 and skirmishes flared up. The efforts of a peace 
commission sent in early 1873 failed, and the Modoc tribe killed several of its members. 
This caused many within the government and general pubic to lose sympathy with the 
tribe, and the military pushed ahead with full force, causing the Modoc to surrender in 
June 1873.18  
In the Southwest, the Apache occupied the United States military. They were 
known for their guerilla style warfare, and the Army was dispatched to Arizona in 1870. 
A peace commission was dispatched to attempt to negotiate with the Apache. The failure 
of the negotiators caused the citizens in the area take matters into their own hands, and 
they killed eighty-five Apaches. Those who committed the murders were tried, but were 
acquitted by a jury.19 Geronimo, leader of the Chiricahua Apache, and his band would 
continue to terrorize white settlers in the Southwest throughout the 1870s. 
 Perhaps the best-known Indian war in this period was with the Sioux on the Great 
Plains. The Sioux were fighting off encroachment of white settlers in the Black Hills 
region of the Dakotas. A part of this encroachment that threatened the Sioux was an 
expedition led by General George A. Custer. The Sioux refused to remain on their 
assigned reservation, and orders were given for the military to force them to their 
reservation in 1875. The situation worsened, and on February 1, 1876, Secretary of the 
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Interior Zachariah Chandler declared all tribes not on their reservations hostile. The 
Sioux resisted and Custer and his troops faced off with them June 25 on the Little 
Bighorn.20 Custer’s annihilation made headlines and many began to question, once again, 
the control the Department of the Interior had over the tribes. More importantly, the 
violence only highlighted some of the more serious issues with Indian Policy and its 
enforcement. The Department of War and its supporters in Congress used the wars as a 
way to bring the transfer debate back to the forefront. 
Peace Commission of 1867 
 The wars with the Sioux, Lakota, Kiowa, Cheyenne, and Modoc, concerned 
Congress since a number of these battles had continued following the conclusion of the 
Civil War. Congress created the Peace Commission of 1867, the first of several Peace 
Commissions to be created by Congress to negotiate with these hostile tribes.21 Congress 
authorized the Peace Commission July 20, and it was made up of four special agents and 
four military officers, all with the rank of brigadier-general or higher.22  They met in St. 
Louis, Missouri on August 6 and prepared for their tour, which would primarily focus on 
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the Dakota Territory, Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado Territory. Their primary goals 
were “to remove, if possible, the causes of war,” “secure, as far as practicable, our 
frontier settlements and the safe building of our railroads,” and “to suggest or inaugurate 
some plan for the civilization of the Indians.”23  
 The commission’s report is extremely critical of the United States’ policy toward 
the tribes. Throughout its report, the Commission pointed out the inconsistencies between 
the terms of the treaties and the actions of the government. The Commission consistently 
suggested that the treaties were “in utter disregard of their [the tribes’] wants.”24 An 
example was Brulé Chief Swift Bear’s request for ammunition so that his tribe could 
hunt. Hunting was vital to the survival of his tribe, but the game was disappearing from 
the plains and the use of bow and arrows no longer yielded satisfactory results.25 
 Following their seemingly brief investigation in the northern plains, the 
Commission traveled south and remained in Medicine Lodge, Kansas where they met 
with a variety of tribes and successfully negotiated treaties with the Kiowas, Comanches, 
and Apaches. They were also able to create an informal agreement with Cheyenne and 
Arapahoes. One of the key reasons these tribes were hostile was because the government 
stopped paying annuities to the tribes. The Peace Commission was authorized to 
negotiate new annuities and authorized the release of annuities that they tribes were 
previously due.26 Having briefly described the meetings with various tribes, the 
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commission went on to explain what they viewed as the causes of the hostilities on the 
Plains. 
 Although the report is not detailed with regard to each tribe, it explains that white 
settlers from the East encroached upon many of the tribes on the plains. These settlers 
were being drawn west by the prospect of gold and, in the process, driving off the game. 
This required the tribes to expand their hunting grounds. The movement of the white and 
Indian populations led to inevitable clashes. The report detailed other incidents, but the 
most common issue for tribes was the failure of Congress to carry out the terms of the 
treaties to which they had agreed. Even more troubling to the tribes was the change in 
treaties without their consent. For example, in an 1861 treaty, the Cheyenne agreed to a 
set price per acre for their lands, but when the treaty reached Congress, the terms were 
altered. In addition, their annuities were reduced. They had no representation within the 
government to fight these changes.27 
 The Commission then turned to the policy of civilizing the tribes. They believed 
“if they [Indian and whites] could live together, the Indian by this contact would soon 
have become civilized and war would have been impossible.”28 They believed that the 
tribes could be civilized and that it was their “savageness” at the root of the wars on the 
plains.29 They openly admitted, however, that the two living together had not worked for 
three reasons: “1. the antipathy of race, 2. the difference of customs and manners, and 3. 
the difference in language.”30 The key to civilization was the education the tribal youth in 
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an American manner. It was a common held belief that this would civilize the tribes over 
time. 
 The Peace Commission made a series of recommendations to President Andrew 
Johnson as to how to improve the United States’ relationship, not just with warring tribes, 
but also with all tribes. The first, and perhaps most important, was that the BIA should no 
longer pay annuities in cash. They argued that this type of payment allowed for 
corruption within the BIA. In addition, the tribes had no use for cash. Instead, they 
suggested that annuities consist of “domestic animals, agricultural and mechanical 
implements, clothing,” and only other necessities to make them self-sufficient.31 This 
echoed the recommendations made by the Doolittle Committee.32 
 One of the Commission’s primary goals was to find suitable reservation land for 
the tribes of the Northern Plains. They recommended the creation a second Indian 
Territory in the Northern Plains that would serve two purposes: control overcrowding in 
the original Indian Territory and allow the tribes of the northern plains to remain closer to 
their traditional hunting grounds.33 The Treaty of Fort Laramie carried out this plan in 
1868 with the creation of the Great Sioux Reservation.34 
 Their third suggestion dealt exclusively with the tension between the Department 
of War and Department of the Interior. It was recommended that the Trade and 
Intercourse Laws be revised.35 They had not been updated since 1834, and therefore did 
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not define the role of the Department of the Interior following its creation in 1849.36 
While all responsibility of the Department of War was to be handed over the Department 
of the Interior with regard to Indian policy, the Department of War still played a key role 
in Indian Policy. The laws, which had not been updated since the transfer, bound the 
military to Indian Policy. This caused tension between the two departments, and the 
commission believed that a clear definition of the duties of each department would 
relieve some of the tension and subdue the transfer debates.37 
 The commission moved on to the question of whether the military should have 
control over Indian Policy. Before making their recommendation, they suggested that the 
United States should clarify its policy, “If we intend to have war with them the bureau 
should go to the Secretary of War. If we intend to have peace it should be in the civil 
department.”38 The commission was in favor of a pacifying policy with the Indians and 
believed the Department of the Interior was capable of carrying this out. Realizing, 
however, that there was an issue with corruption in the BIA, they recommended that all 
superintendents, agents, and specials agents be replaced. The Commission believed that 
new regulations would be better carried out by new personnel.39 
 The Sand Creek Massacre was reconsidered by the Peace Commission as one of 
their suggestions was that no state or territorial governor should be allowed to call upon 
local militias to fight against the tribes. In 1864, the Cheyenne were at war, but not with 
the United States army, instead they found themselves at war with the Colorado militia. 
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The commission concluded that if there are going to be Indian wars, they should be 
carried out by the regular army, meaning, with federal approval. Fighting the tribes on a 
local level damaged the relationship between the tribes and the United States.40 
 In addition to revising the intercourse laws, the committee suggested a renewed 
trade policy with the tribes. Although the Trade and Intercourse Laws required traders to 
register, it was fairly easy to carry out trade without doing so. There was no clear way to 
control those who traded with the tribes; therefore, tribes often dealt with corrupt traders 
and traders willing to trade alcohol, which had been banned. In addition to renewed 
control over traders, the Peace Commission suggested that the government create laws 
that authorized the removal of white settlers from Indian land and reservations. The 
report suggests that this would be yet another task for the military.41 
 The final two suggestions were to follow up with the Navajo and Sioux tribes, as 
they were unable to reach agreements with them. In the case of the Navajo, the 
commission suggests a treaty be negotiated as the tribe spent some time as prisoners of 
war at great expense to the United States. In the case of the Sioux, they recommended a 
similar Peace Commission be authorized to meet with them in the spring of 1868. 
Removal was suggested in both cases.42 
The majority of the suggestions from the Peace Commission called for a 
centralization of Indian Policy. There was clearly an issue with the BIA and its control, or 
lack thereof, over policy; however, the Peace commission did not appear to have any 
long-standing effects on the way in which the government handled Indian Policy. The 
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report pointed out inconstancies between the Departments of government. The building 
of railroads through reservation lands without the approval of the tribes exemplified this 
lack of communication. Nevertheless, the Peace Commission was important as it 
reaffirmed many of the points brought up in the Doolittle Committee’s final report.43 
Grant’s Peace Policy 
 In the midst of Reconstruction,44 the election of 1868 brought Ulysses S. Grant to 
the White House. He would work with factions of the government in an attempting to 
rework Indian Policy. The Doolittle Committee and Peace Commission highlighted 
several inconsistencies within the policy of the United States toward the tribes and made 
a number of suggestions to improve that relationship. Although many of these 
suggestions would go unanswered, there were a number of attempted reforms made 
during the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant. His so-called “Peace Policy” took into 
consideration the suggestions made by the Doolittle Committee and the Peace 
Commission.45 
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 Within the first year of Grant’s presidency, he began to outline his Peace Policy 
with the primary goal to eliminate the causes of tension between the tribes and the United 
States. One early concern of Grant’s was that Congress had not followed through with 
any of the suggestions or treaties made by the Peace Commission of 1867. So on March 
8, 1870, he wrote a letter to Congress expressing his concern.46 In it, he discussed a 
recent attack carried out by the military upon a group of Piegan Indians and the pubic 
outcry it generated.47 Grant was not as concerned with the Piegan incident, but was 
concerned with the Sioux. The tribe had been hostile toward the United States for 
decades, which came at great cost. Grant understood that white encroachment was at the 
root of Indian hostility, and he noted that even peaceful tribes were experiencing 
encroachment. He concluded his letter by stating, “it will be cheaper to feed every adult 
Indian now living, even to sleepy surfeiting, during his natural life, while their children 
are educated to self-support by agriculture, that it would be to carry on a general Indian 
war for a single year.”48 
 One of the earliest reforms made by Grant was the creation of the Board of Indian 
Commissioners.49 The Board was created in 1869 and comprised of nine philanthropists 
who served as advisors to the BIA. Those appointed to the board were members of the 
various religious organizations that were present on the reservations. Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Ely S. Parker, a member of the Seneca tribe, asked the Board, in a May 26, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 S. Exec. Doc. 57, 41st Congress, 2nd Sess. (1870), Archive of Americana 1094A13B02B25690. 
47 The massacre of Piegan Indians by order of General Philip Sheridan caused a public and 
humanitarian outcry. Grant had to have been concerned about that as well as the possibility of violence by 
other tribes. For more on the Piegan massacre: Prucha, The Great Father, 1:514. 
48 S. Exec. Doc. 57, 41st Congress, 2nd Sess. (1870), 5. 
49 The Board of Indian Commissioners is widely acknowledged in the historiography as a part of 
Grant’s Peace Policy, and is largely covered in the same text. More can be read on the Board of Indian 
Commissioners in Priest, Uncle Sam’s Stepchildren, 42-53; Prucha, The Great Father, 1:501-12; and 




1869 letter, to focus on a series of questions that the board should consider related to 
aspects of Indian Policy. The legislation that created the Board of Indian Commissioners 
suggested that the Board and Commissioner should “exercise joint control [of Indian 
Affairs] with the Interior Department.”50 The authority of the Board of Indian 
Commissioners was never fully explained, and they would often clash with the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior. Nevertheless, Grant 
viewed them as an important, independent, group that could offer an alternative view. 
They were uncompensated for their service, and President Grant considered the Board to 
be a vital connection between the BIA and the Indian agencies.51  
The idea for the Board came about during the Civil War when the BIA was 
experimenting with new ways to appoint agents in the field. Part of the Peace Policy 
called for an increase missionaries’ role on reservations. Grant devised a plan to 
apportion the Indian agencies among the church organizations.52 They would be given the 
authority to select agents and forward their recommendations to the President. While the 
appointment of agents was still the President’s, Grant’s goal was to eliminate the spoils 
system, a system that often promoted inexperienced men as Indian agents. Grant failed to 
follow through with his plans to end corruption, as he would often appoint those he knew 
to Indian posts. The use of religious leaders as de facto governmental agents concerned 
several in Congress including Representative John K. Luttrell of California who 
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suggested that church members were not qualified to manage the large amount of money 
placed in their trust.53 
 One of the most significant changes made by the Peace Policy was the end of 
treaty making with the tribes in 1871.54 The end of treaty making was a major shift in 
Indian Policy. Like the Board of Indian Commissioners, the end of treaty making was 
viewed as a major part of Grant’s Peace Policy despite the fact the debate began before 
Grant came to office. It is viewed as an attempt to increase the dependence of the tribes 
on the United States. They felt that treating the tribes as though they were separate 
nations would only encourage them to remain separate.55  
Legislation to bring about the end of treaty making came rather slowly in 
Congress. The House of Representatives had been concerned that the Senate held treaty-
making power over the tribes and believed that both houses of Congress should 
participate in the creation of Indian Policy. This debate began in 1867, but legislation 
failed. When it came time for Congress to approve the BIA’s budget for 1872, the House 
refused to act unless the tradition of making treaties with the tribes ended. In the end, the 
House won the debate when treaty making was ended by Congress on March 3, 1871.56 
 Despite the end of treaty making, agreements were made with the tribes. These 
were sometimes made without the consent of Congress. Special agents were sent to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Donald J. D’Elia, “The Argument over Civilian or Military Indian Control, 1865-1880,” 
Historian 24, no. 2 (February 1963), 216. 
54 The end of Treaty Making was a major shift in Indian Policy. Like the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, it is viewed a part of Grant’s Peace Policy. It is viewed as an attempt to increase the 
dependence of the tribes on the United States. It is covered solidly in the historiography by: Prucha, The 
Great Father, 1:527-33; Prucha, American Indian Treaties: A History of a Political Anomaly (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1994); Priest, Uncle Sam’s Stepchildren, 96-102. The end of treaty making is also 
discussed by Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian tribes, and the Constitution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 64-65. 
55 Prucha, The Great Father, 1:527-33. 




tribes to make these agreements, but the rationale for this was for the tribes to rely more 
on the government itself, as opposed to a worthless piece of paper because, as the 
Doolittle Committee and Peace Commission discovered, the terms of many treaties were 
often violated by the United States, thus upsetting the tribes and creating violence. 
Supporters of the discontinuation of treaty making suggested that ending the use of 
treaties would eliminate the reliance upon them by the tribes.57 
 The Peace Policy was met with differing reactions throughout the country. It was 
unpopular in Arizona due to the raids of the Apache. This made it difficult for John H. 
Stout, agent to the Pimas, to improve the tribe’s conditions because it was difficult to get 
BIA approval for the contraction of buildings and delivery of supplies.58 By contrast, 
James Irwin was able to make a profound impact on the lives of the Shoshone and 
Bannock in Wyoming by ignoring the chain of command and making the changes on his 
own authority. While Irwin did not have to worry about an angry local population, he did 
have to deal with the bureaucracy to get anything done.59 The primary difference between 
the two agents was not their locations, however. It was their personalities. Irwin was 
more forceful and would often act before getting approval from the BIA.60 Stout was 
more cautious. This was common within the BIA. It was often not the policy that 
improved the conditions of the tribes, but the person in charge at the time. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 While Priest, Uncle Sam’s Stepchildren, 100-2, largely suggests that the tribes were over reliant 
on the treaties, Prucha, The Great Father, 1:532-3 suggests that treaty making did not end. The tribes 
would instead be subjected to agreements, which were carried out much like the treaties had been. 
58 Stout’s struggle with the Peace Policy and local residents is outlined in, Robert A. Trennert, 
“John H. Stout and the Grant Peace Policy among the Pimas,” Arizona and the West 28 (Spring 1986): 45-
68, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40133850. 
59 Irwin’s experience is documented by Henry E. Stamm, IV, “The Peace Policy at Wind River: 
The James Irwin Years, 1871-1877,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History 41 (Summer 1991): 56-
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 Despite the efforts to reform the BIA under the Peace Policy, the reform efforts 
failed. The Board of Indian Commissioners and church-run agencies found themselves in 
trouble. The Board clashed with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and Secretary of the 
Interior. When the board was created, its duties were not clearly defined and a power 
struggle began. By 1874, the Board was frustrated and all its original members resigned. 
The church missions found the responsibility placed upon them to be too much as well. 
Another issue arose with a battle between the Protestant missions and Catholic missions. 
The BIA divided the reservations among the Protestant groups leaving the Catholic 
missionaries only with those reservations they possessed prior to the reforms. The 
Mormons, too, were left out, as were many of the Southern Protestant sects. The plan was 
supposed to remove politics from the BIA but instead created a new set of politics.61 
Banning Committee 
The continuing tensions between the Department of War and Department of the 
Interior, along with the continuing wars on the Plains, Southwest, and the Pacific 
Northwest, had called into question the control of the Department of the Interior. Once 
again, the transfer debate was brought up in Congress in 1875. The Doolittle Committee, 
carried out by Congress’s Committee on Indian Affairs, had recommended the BIA 
remain a civilian agency, as did the Peace Commission of 1867. In 1875, however, the 
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Committee on Military Affairs began an investigation into the Army’s budget.62 They 
met throughout the fall of 1875 and interviewed seventy-nine witnesses, all of them 
military but two. Their final report was delivered to Congress on March 9, 1876.63 
Leading the Committee on Military Affairs was Ohio Representative Henry B. 
Banning, a Democrat, who introduced the legislation in which massive cuts in military 
spending and in the size of the standing army were included.64 While this did not deal 
directly with Indian Policy, one of the ten questions asked of each of the sixty65 military 
officers interviewed was, “What is your opinion as to the propriety of transferring the 
Indian and Pension Bureaus to the War Department?”66 Although the issue of reduction 
in pay and the standing army would be the central theme of the report, the inclusion of a 
question about the transfer was in response to the reintroduction of the debate in 
Congress. 
 When testimony could not be given directly by a witness, the committee sent a 
letter with the questionnaire to the recipient. Several of the military officers took 
advantage of this form of communication. General of the Army William T. Sherman 
responded to the question quite simply, “The transfer of the Indian Bureau would result 
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62 Members of the committee included: Henry B. Banning, J. M. Glover, A. S. Williams, William 
Terry, John Reilly, A. A. Hardenbergh, and Phil. Cook; H.R. Report No. 354, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876), 
Archive of Americana 10C5781A535EFC00, 6. 
63 Since the Banning Committee’s final report deals largely with the reduction in pay of officers 
and the reduction of the military, many Indian historians ignore the content of the report. Although it is 
heavily biased, it is important to understand the arguments for the transfer of the BIA to the Department of 
War as well as the continued questioning of the Department of the Interior. The Banning Committee is 
briefly mentioned in Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 86-7, but only in the context 
of the cuts to the military, not the transfer question. The Banning Committee is also briefly discussed by 
Prucha, The Great Father, 1:557-8. 
64 The full text of the report and testimony can be found: H.R. Report No. 354, 44th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1876). 
65 “General [of the Army], Lieutenant-General, the major-generals, all the brigadier-generals but 
one, thirty-one colonels, and twenty-nine lieutenant-colonels, majors, and captains.” H.R. Report No. 354, 
44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876), 4. 




in economy and efficiency,”67 but admitted, “I do not profess to know anything of the 
practical workings of the Indian Bureau as now organized; but if transferred to the War 
Department, I suppose it will be made subject to such changes as the Secretary of War 
may recommend.”68 This quote illustrates the lack of knowledge by members of the 
military as to the purpose of the BIA, as well as a lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
Sherman. The overwhelming majority of the officers interviewed would echo Sherman’s 
opinion that the department would be better off under the control of the Department of 
War because it would eliminate corruption and reduce the budget, but they failed to 
explain how the transfer could affect the relationships with the tribes. 
 Only two officers of the sixty interviewed opposed the transfer. One of the two 
was William Welsh, the former Chairman of the Board of Indian Commissioners. While 
he admitted there were flaws with the BIA and its handling of Indian Policy, he believed 
that the Department of War was ill-equipped to continue the civilizing mission begun by 
the Department of the Interior. He openly admitted to the committee that he believed the 
Army would be better suited to deliver supplies and annuities, but Welsh’s primary 
concern was the civilizing mission. As a religious man, he felt that the civilization and 
Christianization of the tribes was most important and he knew the military did not view 
either of those policies favorably.69 Religious officials favored the Department of the 
Interior because of its civilization efforts, and the role given to religious organizations 
under Grant’s Peace Policy. 
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 The final report suggests that the Department of War could eliminate the 
corruption and even save the government money by consolidating military and civilian 
positions, despite Congress banning military officers from holding civilian positions in 
1870, primarily as a response to Grant’s patronage system of appointing Army officers to 
government positions.70 They argued that it was impossible for military officers to be 
dishonest because they were acting on orders and feared the loss of their jobs if they 
failed to carry out such orders.71 
 The commission concluded by stating, “In view of all the evidence adduced, we 
are of the opinion that the conduct of Indian affairs under civil administration, after a 
practical working of twenty-seven years, has proved fraudulent, expensive, and 
unsatisfactory to the Indians, provoking them to hostilities that have cost the Government 
many millions, besides the lives of thousands of citizens and destruction of their property, 
whereas the affairs of this branch of the public service, while under the control of the 
War Department, were honestly, economically, and firmly administered and executed.”72 
The report argued that the Department of War was better equipped for handling the BIA, 
but when this conclusion was pared with the other cost cutting measures proposed by the 
report, a different possibility was suggested. The military needed the BIA for its funds. 
The amount appropriated for the BIA in 1874 was $6.4 million.73 That would have 
brought much-needed funds into the army as well as enabled them to serve a purpose. As 
Reconstruction concluded, it became clear the army was no longer of major importance 
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70 President Grant commonly appointed army officers as Indian agents, but  Congress banned 
members of the military from serving in civilian positions on July 15, 1870. Prucha, The Great Father, 
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71 H.R. Report No. 354, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876), 6. 
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since the army was in a time of general peace. The Banning Committee supported this 
because it called for a reduction in troop levels, and a reduction in pay. 
 The Banning Report ignored the suggestions of the Doolittle Committee and 
Peace Commission. They both found that not enough was being done for the tribes and 
that neither the Department of the Interior nor Department of War were effective in 
carrying out the terms of the treaties. This was the chief cause for Indian hostility during 
this era. White encroachment and the expansion of the United States were threatening the 
tribes and their land. Nevertheless, the failure of Grant’s Peace Policy, the continuing 
violence, and the military’s desire for a role, led Congress, once again, to introduce 
legislation proposing the transfer of the BIA to the Department of War. Congress voted, 
once again, to create a special Joint Committee to investigate the transfer issue. Unlike 






The Transfer Debate at the Forefront: The 1878 Joint Committee 
 
 The failed reforms, Indian Wars, and political climate of the 1870s led Congress 
to consider transferring the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) from the Department of the 
Interior to the Department of War. This debate had come up in Congress on a number of 
occasions following the BIA’s transfer from the War Department to the newly created 
Department of the Interior in 1849. This time, however, the attempt was more serious as 
the issue would be explored in greater detail. Congress created the Joint Committee 
Appointed to take into Consideration the Expediency of Transferring the Indian Bureau 
to the War Department (hereafter referred to as the Joint Committee or the Committee) in 
1878.1 They interviewed seventy-nine witnesses who would give their opinion as to who 
was better suited to handle the BIA. 
 Historians largely ignore this report and testimony because it, as Francis Paul 
Prucha put it, “repeated endlessly all the old arguments on both sides,” but it was the only 
report to focus exclusively on the transfer debate.2 While the Doolittle Committee, Peace 
Commission of 1867, and Banning Committee all discussed the transfer issue, this is the 
only in-depth investigation available. The testimony of the Secretary of the Interior and 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs explored a series of reforms that had been carried out 
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1 The Joint Committee of 1878 is not covered in the mainstream historiography. Prucha, for 
example, briefly discusses the events surrounding the transfer debate, but quickly dismissed the Joint 
Committee testimony saying the testimony “repeated endlessly all the old arguments on both sides”  The 
Great Father, 1:558. Others do discuss the creation of the committee is detail, however. Knecht’s Master’s 
thesis devotes a chapter to the Joint Committee and its contribution to the transfer debates, “The Proposed 
Transfer of the Indian Bureau to the Department of War” (Master’s thesis, New Mexico State University, 
1973), 29-43. An article that discusses the transfer debate in detai, and the committee’s creation is Donald 
J. D’Elia, “The Argument over Civilian or Military Indian Control, 1865-1880,” Historian 24, no. 2 
(February 1963), 207-225. 
2 Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American 




within the department prior to the Committee’s investigation. These reforms were not 
radical, but they did directly address many of the charges that were made against the 
Department of the Interior by those who supported the Department of War. In addition to 
exploring the transfer issue, this report explored several reforms that proved successful at 
eliminating corrupt agents and allowed the tribes to have a degree of self-policing. 
Creating the Committee 
 After a brief failed transfer attempt in 1874, the issue was reintroduced in the 
House of Representatives in November 1877.3 The Forty-Fifth Congress spent a portion 
of its first session discussing the transfer issue. During this session, three transfer 
attempts were made, but all failed as they failed to have majority support in Senate.4 
Henry Banning of Ohio introduced the first.5 Banning had been in charge of the 1876 
investigation into the Army, which resulted in the recommendation that the BIA be 
transferred to the Department of War.6 Roger Q. Mills of Texas and Alfred M. Scales of 
North Carolina introduced the other two bills. The three Representatives were Democrats, 
the party that had supported and would continue to support the transfer during and after 
the Joint Committee’s investigation.7 This divide was unsurprising, as the Democrats had 
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3 James John Knecht II, “The Proposed Transfer of the Indian Bureau to the Department of War” 
(Master’s thesis, New Mexico State University, 1973), 16. 
4 Knecht, “The Proposed Transfer of the Indian Bureau to the Department of War,” 29. A brief 
description of each bill can be found in the Congressional Record. For H.R. 295, U.S. Congressional 
Record, 45th Congress, 1st Session, Microfilm, 179, reel 9. For H.R. 655, U.S. Congressional Record, 45th 
Congress, 1st Session, Microfilm, 192, reel 9. For H.R. 959, U.S. Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 1st 
Session, Microfilm, 236, reel 9. 
5 U.S. Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 1st Session, Microfilm, 179, reel 9. 
6 H.R. Report No. 354, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876), Archive of Americana 10C5781A535EFC00. 
7 Knecht, “The Proposed Transfer of the Indian Bureau to the Department of War,” 29. The reason 
the House of Representatives and Senate disagreed over the transfer issues can be explained by looking at 
their numbers. The House was governed by a Democratic majority “House History: 45th Congress,” United 
States House of Representatives, http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/index.aspx (accessed 




supported the Department of War’s control over the BIA while the Republicans 
supported the Department of the Interior’s approach.8 
 The failure of these initial attempts silenced the debate for a few months in 
Congress, but on February 8, 1878, the Legislature of California sent a concurrent 
resolution to the United States House of Representatives supporting the transfer of the 
BIA to the Department of War. The document only contained two paragraphs and did not 
provide specific reasoning for the transfer request. The debate had begun in Congress and 
the California legislature was voicing its support for the transfer. It was the only state to 
do so.9 
The transfer attempts also prompted a reply from the Cherokee, Creek and 
Seminole, and Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations of Indian Territory, delivered on 
February 25, 1878. The tribes disagreed with the need for transfer. They believed a 
transfer to the Department of War would bring about war. The tribes pointed out that 
previous Congresses and committees had investigated the transfer issue before and they 
came to the conclusion that the Department of the Interior was better suited for the BIA. 
The tribes’ report argued that the transfer would not be of benefit to any tribes. They also 
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Congress (1877-1879),” United States Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (accessed January 14, 2012). 
8 Historian Fred S. Rolater explained in the divide between the two parties in, “The American 
Indian and the Origin of the Second American Party System,” The Wisconsin Magazine of History 76 
(Spring 1993): 180-203, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4636431. Rolater explains that the issue was largely 
sectional with those in the Northeast supporting a humane approach to the tribes, while those in the South 
and West preferred a military approach. The Whigs had a pro-Indian and anti-removal stance, which 
largely carried over to the Republican Party. 
9 H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 45th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1878), Archive of Americana 
10CBA6D8D2D1B7F0. California had a tumaltoius history with the Untied States. The Indians present in 
California were only part of the issue. There were also Californios (Spanish-speaking Catholics) present in 
California that the government had to deal with. For more on the relationship between the United States, 
Indians, and Californios see James A. Sandos, “’Because He Is a Liar and a Thief’: Conquering the 





referred to the general peace in Indian Territory and the fact that the warring Sioux had 
fled to Canada. They believed that the Department of War was not necessary.10 
 Additionally, the tribes suggested there could be legal issues regarding the 
proposed transfer. The Cherokee pointed specifically to Article 10 of their treaty, which 
stated, “no license to trade goods, ware, or merchandise shall be granted by the United 
State to trade in the Cherokee Nation, unless approved by the Cherokee National 
Council.”11 While this does not seem to apply to the transfer issue, they continued, “The 
transfer bill virtually says that the Secretary of War shall have authority to regulate trade 
in the issuing of licenses.”12 While it is unclear if that argument would have held up in a 
United States court, it is clear the Cherokee and its fellow tribes were well researched in 
the United States legal code. Additionally, these tribes carried a fair bit of political 
weight, and they were not afraid to exercise it. 
 With the continued debate in Congress, the House Committee on Indian Affairs 
prepared a report that researched the issue in greater detail. Reported on February 25, 
1878, the same day as the Cherokee’s document protesting the transfer, the report was 
divided into two parts, those for and those against the transfer. The opinion of the 
overwhelming majority of the Committee on Indian Affairs supported the transfer of the 
BIA.13 They cited several reasons that were questionable. First, they suggest that all 
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Indians were “savages” and that those tribes who were civilized, such as the Five 
Civilized Tribes in Indian Territory, were only civilized due to the influence of whites.14 
 The committee focused heavily on the testimony of military officers and generals 
from the Doolittle Committee and the Peace Commission of 1867.15 Each side of the 
argument was able to draw opposing conclusions from the same reports. This is largely 
due to the opposing testimonies they cited. The report illustrates they were concerned 
with money. The report included a chart which showed the amount of savings that would 
be achieved by “abolishing the bureau [Indian], and all the agents, subagents, inspectors, 
superintendents, and many of the employés, and replacing them as far as practicable with 
officers and privates.”16 The chart indicated that eliminating all of these positions and 
replacing them with Army personnel could save $602,907.17  
 The majority opinion did present a solid point in favor of the transfer. They stated, 
“The only alternative left is to transfer the Indian Bureau to the War Department; then we 
have one head, one jurisdiction and one responsibility, and, more than all, we have power 
to command respect and to enforce obedience.”18 Their point of having one group in 
charge as opposed to a civilian arm to feed and clothe them, while the military is there for 
enforcement was a common argument. It is the final part about commanding obedience 
that those opposed to military control objected to. The use of force was unnecessary 
because, as the Cherokee argued, there was a general peace.19 
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to paint a negative picture of the tribes so that the transfer will take place. 
15 H.R. Report No. 241, 45th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1878), 3-5, 10-12. 
16 H.R. Report No. 241, 45th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1878), 6. 
17 H.R. Report No. 241, 45th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1878), 7. 
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 The two members of the House Committee on Indian Affairs opposed to the 
transfer made several points in their dissenting opinion. They suggested that the point of 
the government was not to force obedience, but to lead the tribes to civilization. They 
said that Indians are “exceedingly prone to resist any direct attempt to force him into 
measures against his inclination and previous habits; but on the other hand he may very 
easily be led, after his confidence is fully secured.”20 Those in the minority also referred 
to testimony made by Army officers, in particular General William T. Sherman, General 
William S. Harney, General Alfred H. Terry, and General Christopher C. Augur. These 
generals testified that, “not one in a thousand of the officers of the Army would like to 
teach Indian children to read and write, or Indian men to sow and reap.”21 Clearly the 
Army would not be fit to carry out the civilizing mission enacted decades before. In fact, 
the report suggests that no member of the Army was fit to civilize the tribes. 
The minority opinion suggested that the transfer was not likely to eliminate 
corruption, one of the key charges against the Department of the Interior.22 Their final 
recommendation was not to transfer the BIA, but make it a cabinet-level position. This 
would give it individual authority as opposed to placing it under yet another authority. 
The suggestions and arguments made by the minority were well thought out, but it was 
clear they would be ignored. The fact that the majority of the Committee on Indian 
Affairs supported the transfer of the BIA ensured yet another transfer attempt would be 
made. 
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Because the majority of the Committee on Indian Affairs supported the transfer, 
the issue was reintroduced on the House floor. Using a different tactic, those in favor of 
the transfer issue attached the proposal to the Army appropriations bill in May 1878.23 
The bill, with the transfer amendment, passed the House and continued to the Senate 
where it would be amended yet again. Instead of removing the amendment completely, 
the Senate reworked the amendment and suggested that a Joint Committee be formed to 
investigate the matter. The bill passed the Senate, and passed the House once again. 
President Hayes signed the bill on June 18, 1878. The Joint Committee began its 
preparations a few days later.24 
The 1878 Joint Committee 
 The Joint Committee’s primary task was to investigate the transfer issue. It did so 
by traveling to a series of cities and reservations to interview various tribal members, 
agents, military officers, and other interested parties. Much like the Doolittle Committee 
in 1865, the committee gathered a mountain of testimony to sift through. Unlike 
Doolittle, however, the committee’s task was simple, to determine whether the 
Department of War should be given authority over the BIA. The testimony gathered by 
the 1878 Joint Committee would focus primarily on the transfer debate. 
 The committee was made up of five Representatives and thee Senators. 
Representatives included Alfred M. Scales of North Carolina, Andrew R. Boone of 
Kentucky, Charles E. Hooker of Mississippi, J. H. Stewart of Minnesota, and Nelson H. 
Van Vorhes of Ohio. The three Senators were Alvin Saunders of Nebraska, Richard J. 
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Olglesby of Illinois, and Thomas C. McCreary of Kentucky.25  Before the committee met, 
there was already a political divide between its members. This can be seen in their votes 
on the transfer bills in the Forth-Fifth Congress. McCreary, Scales, Boone, and Hooker, 
all Democrats, supported the transfer of the BIA to the Department of War. Saunders, 
Oglesby, Stewart, and Van Vorhes, all Republicans, opposed the transfer. After months 
of testimony, none would change position due to their political differences.26 
 In order to conduct a thorough investigation, like the Doolittle Committee, they 
traveled to various cities and reservations to gather testimony. Stops included: Indian 
Territory, Nebraska, Utah, and California. While on their tour they interviewed seventy-
nine witnesses. These witnesses would, once again, testify to the condition of the tribes 
and why they felt the Army could better handle the BIA or why they felt it could not.27 
Historian Francis Paul Prucha was correct when he stated that the Committee only 
“repeated endlessly all the old arguments on both sides.”28 After all, the same debate had 
been going on since the 1850s, but this report illustrates why the Department of the 
Interior was better prepared to handle the BIA. The testimony of certain BIA and 
Department of the Interior insiders showed that internal reforms had been made within 
the department since the Doolittle Committee’s investigation in 1865. 
Testimony 
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 Following the investigation, the Committee delivered its report on January 31, 
1879.29 The full testimony was attached. While this Committee’s investigation was 
shorter than that of Doolittle, the findings are just as important. The report clearly 
presents the positions of the interested parties. Army officers and local residents were 
more likely to support the transfer, whereas Indian Agents, religious officials, and the 
tribes themselves opposed it. Like Doolittle, the Joint Committee interviewed a limited 
number of tribal members.30 Their testimony is important as it illustrates that many of the 
issues outlined in the Doolittle Committee were still affecting the tribes. Nevertheless, the 
arguments contained within the Joint Committee’s testimony were more focused than 
those of Doolittle because they were all answering the same question. Should Indian 
Affairs be a matter of civilian or military control? 
 The group that most favored the transfer of the BIA to the Department of War 
was military personnel. The Joint Committee interviewed sixteen active military 
personnel, five of them generals. All had experience in dealing with various tribes. The 
most vocal on Indian Policy prior to the formation of the Joint Committee was Army 
Commander General William T. Sherman. Responding by letter, he supported those in 
favor of the transfer, accurately pointing out that “without the Army the Indian Bureau 
cannot manage these Indians.”31 Sherman also pointed out that the Generals “do not wish 
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30 Tribal members interviewed by the Joint Committee include members of the: Modocs, 
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to transfer our Army to civilian management, we would rather do the work ourselves.”32 
Having to answer to civilian agents had been a cause for conflict between the two 
departments.33 
 Sherman’s suggestion for correcting the issue is one that would be repeated a 
number of times throughout the report. He was in favor of transferring the BIA to the 
Department of War, but “the war Department can employ civilian agents for the peaceful 
tribes, and military agents for the warlike tribes.”34 This suggestion goes against the 
report of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, which suggested that the complete 
elimination of civilian agents would be one of the cost saving advantages of the 
Department of War.35 This is an example of how those in the military who supported the 
transfer were not positive as to what reforms should be made. Military officers made 
other vague statements throughout the report, as they were not sure how to deal with the 
Civilization policy, a policy that had been in effect for over eighty years. 
 Local residents of the states and territories with large Indian populations were in 
support of the transfer of the BIA. F. P. Forester, a resident of San Diego County in 
California, explained how he had employed a number of Indians and felt that the Indians 
did not trust Indian Agents appointed by the Department of the Interior. He pointed out, 
however, that the tribes feared the military and “you can keep them [Indians] down 
through fear and make them work. They will work through fear and finally become 
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civilized.”36 A common thread throughout the report was the suggestion that the military 
could force civilization and, as Forester put it, make them “like all of us.”37 
  Territorial governors were also in favor of military control of the BIA because it 
would almost certainly give them a feeling of security. Arizona Territory Governor John 
P. Hoyt argued that under the current system, if an Indian rebellion were to break out, the 
Department of the Interior would then notify the Department of War. The lag in 
communication concerned Hoyt because he recognized the tension between the two 
departments that might effect response time to such an event. He argued that the transfer 
would place all the responsibility within one department, thus making the system run 
more smoothly.38 He did not believe, however, that “civil officers are any more dishonest 
than military officers.”39 
 The arguments outlined by the Committee on Indian Affairs and by the military, 
local residents, and territorial governors, are largely repeated throughout the report. The 
conclusions drawn from these arguments were that the concern was primarily military 
control, local security, forced civilization, cost effectiveness, and the elimination of 
corruption. Those in favor of the Department of the Interior had similar arguments, 
however. They were concerned with corruption and the civilization of the tribes, but 
believed that the military would resort to force. The atrocities carried out by military as 
described in the Doolittle Committee’s report were often citied as evidence that the 
military was too forceful. 
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The Joint Committee interviewed religious and other reformers. The only 
religious official interviewed was Presbyterian Minister John C. Lowrie who rejected the 
transfer because he believed, like most opposed to the transfer, Army personnel were not 
trained to teach the necessary techniques for civilization.40 Members of the Board of 
Indian Commissioners interviewed by the Committee would echo these sentiments.41 The 
Committee also interviewed Alfred B. Meacham, publisher of the newspaper The Council 
Fire, a journal created in early 1878. He created his newspaper in response to his outrage 
over the handling of Indian Affairs by the government. He felt that the only solution to 
the “Indian question” was “the Indian becoming a civilized man and finally a citizen.”42 
Like Meacham, E. C. Watkins, an Indian inspector, argued that the tribes were not in 
favor of the transfer because they understood that the Army would have a presence 
among them and that was a cause for concern.43 
 The most important testimony came from the tribes themselves. There were a 
number of tribal chiefs and representative agents interviewed by the Committee. They 
were asked the same questions as the other witnesses, particularly about their objections 
to the transfer. One of the first chiefs to be interviewed was Bogus Charley, chief of the 
Modoc. He expressed an objection to the military, partly due to their recent war with the 
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United States.44 The Winnebago were, once again, well represented, with the committee 
interviewing five chiefs.45 All the chiefs and their Agent, Howard White, objected to the 
transfer. 
 Several of the tribes sent their agents to represent them. John D. Miles represented 
the Cheyenne and Arapahoe. He testified that the Army was not prepared to teach 
farming techniques or run schools. He explained that the Cheyenne and Arapahoe had 
been willing to work and learn during his seven years as their agent.46 Another agent 
present was S. W. Marston, agent to the Five Civilized Tribes. He repeated what the 
tribes had expressed in their report to Congress from February 25.47 They were opposed 
to the transfer, and he suggested that the members of his tribe were more than ready to 
become citizens of the United States.48 
 One of the most interesting sections of testimony came from Chief Joseph of the 
Nez Percés. He suggested that the BIA should be abolished all together and that “we 
should have one law to govern us all and we should all live together.”49 Chief Joseph 
explained that the chief cause of war was United States’ reservation policy.50 Those 
against the transfer of the BIA provided strong arguments. The civilization of the tribes 
would not work by force, but the tribes would have to be led into civilization. Many felt 
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the Army was not prepared for this task. The testimony from the tribal members largely 
echoed the arguments that had been put forth by their agents and missionary leaders, but 
their testimony clearly showed that they were not in favor of being handled by the Army. 
BIA Reforms 
 Despite the repetition of the arguments for and against the transfer, there is more 
to be learned from this report.51 The testimony of important figures, such as the Secretary 
of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, suggested that a series of internal 
reforms had taken place. Many of these reforms were not major reforms liked the failed 
Board of Indian Commissioners, but minor internal reforms, designed to curb corruption 
and allow the tribes to police themselves. The testimony of the Interior Secretary and 
Commissioner provides insight into the organization of the BIA and what changes had 
been made to correct certain oversights. 
 The first to be interviewed by the Committee was Secretary of the Interior Carl 
Schurz. Schurz had been Interior Secretary for about a year, and he was asked to give a 
general statement on his thoughts on the transfer and of the BIA in general. Within his 
statement he explained that the Army’s purpose in relation to the BIA should be as a 
police force and only to respond when called.52 The issue, however, was the lag in 
communication as described by Governor Hoyt. It could take weeks for letters to be 
passed from an agency to the Secretary of Interior, who would then have to contact the 
Army. The Army would then issue orders. He noted that the response time with this 
system could have been as much as two months, but with the use of telegrams, he could 
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achieve the same task in a few hours. The expediency of the department changed with the 
leadership, but improved technology was also a factor.53 
 One of the changes Secretary Schurz claims that he had made since coming to 
office was stricter punishments for those agents caught dealing with the tribes 
dishonestly. He noted that a number of the Indian agents had been removed and faced 
indictment for dishonestly in dealing with money or the tribes. He believed that fifteen 
out of the seventy-four agents had been removed for this reason.54 Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs E. A. Hayt confirmed these numbers, adding that thirty-five in total had 
either been removed or resigned.55 He gave an example of the agent for the Crow Agency 
in Montana. The agent turned in vouchers for hay, but inflated the amount of hay 
received to receive extra payment. When this was discovered, he was immediately 
removed.56 
 Commissioner Hayt explained that the removal of a dishonest agent was one of 
the greatest reforms possible. Finding honest men to run an agency was necessary, but so 
were inspectors. He explained that at the time they had only three inspectors, not nearly 
enough to keep up with all seventy-four agents.57 In addition, they had changed the type 
of agent they sought. Commissioner Hayt explained that military officers made poor 
agents, as did ministers, because they did not have a mind for business. They were more 
apt to find agents with a business background who could manage people and money.58 
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Although, as he explained, the Agents handled relatively little money since the supply 
route had changed.59 
 One of the charges of Indian agents was keeping a census of the tribal members 
on their agency. This was how the BIA knew the amount of supplies necessary for the 
various agencies. These numbers were often inflated, but Commissioner Hayt testified 
that they began using a system more similar to that of the United States Census Bureau, 
which registered the Indians by family unit.60 From this they estimated that the number of 
Indians under the care of the government, not including those off reservations, was 
250,811.61 This number exposed the scale of the BIA’s task. 
 Secretary Schurz explained that he had ordered a report to expose corruption and 
weaknesses within his department.62 From this report, he explained that several internal 
changes had been made. He, like Commissioner Hayt, asked for more inspectors, this 
would make the agents more accountable. He also spoke of an experiment that had been 
carried out in twenty-two agencies. The employment of Indians as a police force allowed 
the tribes to police themselves, and he found that the tribes responded well to this. He 
explained that there were currently 450 in the police force, but felt, once expanded to 
other agencies, they could employ as many as 1,200.63  
The use of Indians to police themselves was an interesting tactic. Clearly its 
purpose was to cut down on the use of the military as a police force. It was also believed 
to be a sign that the BIA’s task of civilizing the tribes was working. As Secretary Schurz 
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explained, there were seventy-four agencies, but as the tribes become civilized, they are 
consolidated into wider reaching agencies. In fact, he planned to further consolidate tribes 
so that the number of agencies could be lowered. It is important that this type of 
consolidation could take place. It speaks of the successes the BIA had with certain tribes. 
While the majority of these tribes were concentrated in Indian Territory, this showed 
progress.64 
Both men offered similar recommendations for the future of Indian Policy. They 
wanted Congress to act to provide more inspectors and Secretary Schurz asked that 
Congress be more expedient in carrying out terms of treaties.65 These recommendations 
would only make the task of the Secretary and Commissioner easier, and would ensure 
that a more honest and efficient BIA existed. They had already begun the process of 
reform by changing supply lines, but by placing tougher restrictions on agents and 
ensuring goods were properly inspected, the BIA answered the most common criticism of 
the BIA by those who supported the War Department.66 
The Final Report 
 Prucha criticized the Joint Committee because it “could not overcome its partisan 
differences.”67 Delivered in January 1879, the Committee submitted separate reports, one 
by those in favor and the other by those opposed.68 The split that had existed prior to the 
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testimony remained at its conclusion, along party lines. Therefore, McCreary, Scales, 
Boone, and Hooker, all Democrats, supported the transfer while Saunders, Oglesby, 
Stewart, and Van Vorhes, all Republicans, opposed it. Of course this did not matter, as 
Congress was no longer interested in the transfer issue, but the split in opinion would 
have made it difficult for any legislation to pass both the House and Senate.69  
The final transfer attempt came May 8, 1880, but it died in committee.70 The 
House of Representatives, which usually championed the transfer, could no longer 
support the cause. Indian wars were no longer an issue and the BIA was functioning more 
smoothly than it had before. Another major reason the issue was pushed off was due to 
the beginnings of the next major shift in Indian Policy. Throughout the Committee’s 
testimony, Army officers, agents, and the tribes were all asked if they believed tribes 
were ready to own land in severalty. The majority of those questioned agreed. Although 
the Dawes Act would not be passed until 1883, this committee was laying its 
foundation.71
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 James John Knecht’s assertion that the Joint Committee of 1878 provided 
evidence that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had matured since the debate over 
control of BIA began in the 1850s is correct.1 What he failed to acknowledge, however, 
was that the Joint Committee was not the only Congressional committee to explore the 
issue. The Doolittle Committee of 1865, the Peace Commission of 1867 and the Banning 
Committee of 1876 all had expressed their opinion on the transfer issue. The Doolittle 
Committee and Peace Commission even went as far as to suggest changes in Indian 
Policy to improve the relationship between the United States and the tribes. 
 There were very few consistent Indian Policies from the 1770s through the 1870s. 
The one exception was the civilization policy, which was first introduced in the Trade 
and Intercourse Acts of 1792. This policy was designed to introduce American culture, 
education and Christianity to the tribes. It was a policy that continued throughout the 
nineteenth century. A number of other policies were introduced, but they were never 
permanent or all encompassing. While Congress would rarely heed the advice of the 
committees it created, the fact that the Department of the Interior and the Department of 
War were fighting over control of the BIA and Indian Policy suggests its importance.  
 As outlined in this thesis, there are a number of important developments in the 
national Indian policy. The first major policy was the establishment of a trade 
relationship with the tribes as discussed in Chapter One. This policy kept the tribes on the 
edge of civilization; a practice started by the British, but once the United States won its 
independence, Westward expansion became an important national goal and the tribes 
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were in the way. This led to the second major development of Indian Policy, also 
discussed in first chapter, removal, a policy that was in effect throughout the nineteenth 
century. Removing the eastern tribes from their homelands and placing them on 
reservation lands in Indian Territory, the United States deemed this to be important for 
the safety of the tribes, but ultimately, it was done for the land. 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, the policy of civilization of the tribes was just 
as important as removal. Policy makers believed that by building schools and churches on 
reservations, the tribes would begin to adopt an American lifestyle. Most of the tribes 
resisted these changes. The Five Civilized Tribes may have adopted a number of 
American ideals, a constitution, and American style government, but they worked to 
maintain their tribal identities. This is evident in their response to the proposed transfer of 
the BIA in 1876. The tribes clearly had retained their identity as groups, but the Five 
Civilized Tribes response to the transfer debates in 1878 is also evidence of how 
civilization had worked to a degree. The Five Civilized Tribes include a number of 
Christian references and use of eloquent English.2  
 One of the other major concerns of Indian Policy was the legal position of the 
tribes. Until 1871, the use of treaties suggested that the tribes were foreign entities. 
However, they were not actually viewed as foreign entities by the Federal Government. 
The Cherokee cases of the 1830s deemed the tribes to be subject to federal law; however, 
they were not citizens. They had no constitutional rights and yet they were subjected to 
federal law. It was through these rulings that it was established the tribes were subject to 
federal laws. It was difficult to determine what the federal policy should be. 
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 Throughout this thesis, a number of changes were legislated or enacted by the 
President. The Trade and Intercourse Laws, removal, and civilization were all policies 
enacted by Congress. They had the power to legislate policy, the Doolittle Committee,3 
Peace Commission,4 and 1878 Joint Committee,5 illustrate how Congress failed to 
improve and update the policy when necessary. Doolittle and the Peace Commission 
made a series of recommendations to Congress to correct the major problems they 
discovered. However, as indicated in Chapters 2 and 3, Congress did not act on the 
majority of them. It was the disinterest in Congress that allowed the same, stale 
civilization policy to remain for so long. Congress’s occasional interest in Indian policy 
was often fueled by the transfer debates in the 1870s, but their legislation created a series 
of policies that were aimed at correcting issues in the short term. The recommendations 
of the Peace Commission were especially detailed, but Congress’s failure to act angered 
President Ulysses S. Grant. 
 President Grant’s Peace Policy was an example of how a President could 
influence the reformation of Indian Policy. He urged Congress to act on a number of the 
proposals made by the Peace Commission.6 Two of the major changes made during the 
Peace Policy were the creation of the Board of Indian Commissioners and the 
appointment of Indian Agents by religious organizations. Under this plan the tribes were 
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divided among religious groups. The Board of Indian Commissioners was made up of 
representatives from a number of these groups. However, the religious organizations 
were not prepared to handle the added responsibilities. Because the task of the Board of 
Indian Commissioners was not clearly expressed, a power struggle developed between 
the Board and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Eventually the Board of Indian 
Commissioners and the involvement of the missionary groups were scrapped. 
 These events exemplify the major issue with Indian Policy at the time. The debate 
over who should control it went far beyond the military or civilian debate. Indian Policy 
was in the hands of too many people: Congress, the President, the Supreme Court, and for 
a short time, religious organizations. This only made it more difficult to carryout a 
coherent policy. As the 1878 Joint Committee suggested, the Secretary of the Interior and 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs had a fair amount of influence, and could perform a 
number of tasks without prior consent of Congress. Secretary Carl Schurz and 
Commissioner Ezra A. Hayt had made a number of improvements within the system. But 
it was not just the senior officials of the Department of the Interior and BIA that had 
some leniency, the example of James Irwin and the Wind River Agency in Wyoming 
showed how an Indian Agent could act as well. Irwin often acted first then sought 
permission after the fact. This ensured the actions that most benefited the tribe were 
carried out without being subjected to the growing bureaucracy of the BIA.7 
 Returning, once again, to Caldwell’s question of whether or not there was an 
Indian Policy, perhaps the question should be reformulated to who controls Indian 
Policy? Throughout this thesis, I have shown how Congress, the President, the Supreme 
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Court, the Department of the Interior, the BIA, the Army, and the local agents could 
influence Indian policy. All of these players affected and controlled policy at the local 
level, but only a few could influence the overall policy. Everyone had differing 
interpretations of the policy. The tribes had a say in a number of the reports examined. 
That is important, as it was the larger policies, such as removal and civilization, which 
had the most impact on the tribes.  
The transfer debates were important because two departments were interested in 
controlling Indian Policy. Both departments had inherent weaknesses, as did most 
policies. The Doolittle Committee, the Peace Commission, and the 1878 Joint Committee 
all exposed the weaknesses in Indian Policy, and pressure was placed on the BIA and the 
Department of the Interior to reform its actions. The BIA would certainly mature on its 
own, but the transfer debates meant that the Department of War was always willing to 
point out the mistakes made by the Department of the Interior. It was this internal 
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